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Introduction 
In 62 7 CE, a nomadic army exploded through the Caspian Gates and into the 
northernmost lands of the Sasanian Empire (in present day Dagestan and Azerbaijan). Our 
principal historian, Movses Dasxuranc'i (also called Movses Kagankatvac'i) calls them Khazars, 
and he may well be correct. 1 But they were certainly a part of the Western Turkic KJ1aganate, 
invading at the behest of the great TongYabghu Khagan. According to Movses, the attack was 
exceedingly brutal, with the Turks, in their "universal wrath," slaughtering men. women, and 
children "like shameless and ravenous wolves."2 This was no random attack. It was the opening 
salvo of a grand invasion, planned in concert by the Roman forces of Emperor Hcraclius. In 
time, this invasion would reverse the course of the brutal war between the Romans and 
Sasanians, allowing the Romans to reclaim their eastern provinces, for all the good that would do 
them. After all, shortly afterwards would come another nomadic invasion from the south, 
ushering in the Caliphates of the Arabs. 
The seventh century is among the most pivotal in human history, and the Near East, the 
crucible of the new Islamic world, has attracted a great deal of study. However, an important 
player in the drama has too often been ignored - the First Turkic Kllaganatc. Though the First 
Turkic Khaganate lasted less than a century, its impact on the Eurasian Steppes, especially those 
west of the Altai Mountains, was enormous. It is no coincidence these steppes (including modern 
Central Asia, Southern Russia, and Ukraine) still contain many Turkic-speaking inhabitants. 
Thus, it is rather unsurprising that this period has attracted its fair share of scholarship, 
particularly from a philological perspective. As yet, however, most of it has remained separate 
1 Moses, History, 2.11; for further examination of the relation between these "Khazars" and the Khaganate. see 
below. 
2 Movses, History, 2.11. 
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from historical approaches to the sixth and seventh century Near East, despite the clear historical 
significance of the Turks. There is still a great deal of debate within the scholarship about the 
East-West partition of the First Khaganate, which will be explored below. But with or without 
the support of their Eastern cohorts, the Western Khaganate was more than powerful enough to 
be an effective Roman ally. For the first time, there was a centralized confederation on the 
Pontic-Caspian steppes - comparable to those which had existed along the borders of China and 
Persia. That unprecedented expansion west primed the pump for the greatest revolution of all: 
the establishment of diplomacy with the Roman Empire. 
This alliance bore its greatest fruit in the joint invasion of the Sasanian Empire, but its 
roots stretch back much further, practically to the moment the Turks arrived on the western 
steppes. Put simply, the Turks and Romans had a common enemy in the Sasanians. The benefit 
of an alliance was obvious from the very beginning. The realization of it was not. Certainly, 
there were a great many embassies and nigh-constant diplomatic chicaneries. However, the 
simple fact remains that there is no evidence of any military alliance before that fateful attack of 
627. If the benefit of an alliance was so clear, then what could be the explanation for its failure to 
become reality before the seventh century? 
To answer this question, a coherent and comprehensible narrative of Turco-Roman 
relations must first be constructed, beginning with their arrival on the western steppes c. 552 CE 
and ending with the collapse of the First Khaganate c. 650. The sixth century world that the 
Turks arrived was dominated by the Romans and Sasanians, and since the reign of Anastasius. 
Into that powder keg strode a fully formed Turkic empire, intent on carving out its place in what 
once were Sasanian-dominatcd regions. The first emperor to seize the opportunity this presented 
was Justin II, whose mission to the Western Turks met with qualified success, although without 
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an alliance. But after .Justin's reign, Turco-Roman relations soured, reaching a nadir marked by 
failed embassies and raids on Roman holdings. This state of affairs did not change until the 620s, 
when the alliance was finally cemented by Heraclius to great success, before the Tang and Arab 
conquests changed everything. 
A few key points emerge again and again from this narrative. First is the continued 
insistence of the Turkic Khaganate on being treated as an equal empire to the Romans and 
Sasanians. Perhaps even more remarkable is their success in achieving the closest thing to that 
acknowledgment the Romans were willing to give, if even for the briefest of moments. The 
second, closely related point is the high level of diplomatic sophistication evinced by the 
Khaganate in interacting with the Romans. Given that the Turks cut their teeth interacting with 
Chinese civilization, this should not be terribly surprising. Still, it is remarkable and clearly came 
as a surprise to the Romans. That sophistication is useful, considering the third point: the clear 
expansionist agenda of the Turkic Khaganate. It would be absurd to suggest that there was any 
complete grand strategy on the minds of the Kl1agans. However, their obsessions and general 
aims remain remarkably similar over the timespan - impressive for a characteristically unstable 
and civil war-prone nomadic empire. 
The fourth combines the prior three in stating that the Western Kbaganate was 
unprecedented. Certainly, steppe nomads had played an ever-present role in the Greco-Roman 
oikumene, from Scythians and Sarrnatians to Huns. But none ever matched the same level of 
sophistication and centralization that the Turks brought to the west. They were every bit the 
equals of the great settled states, with goals and the ability to achieve them. The only fitting 
comparison is the Xiongnu, with whom the Romans did not interact in a meaningful capacity. In 
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itself, the uniqueness of the Turks is worthy of note, but when combined with the importance of 
the time period it becomes even more pivotal to understand. 
The diplomatic interplay between the Romans and Turks was an ever-present factor in 
the Near East from c. 552 to c. 650, and their alliance played a pivotal role in constructing the 
settlement which would be toppled by the Muslims shortly thereafter. Thus, the Turkic 
Khaganate stands at the crossroads of history, worthy of a far greater attention than they are 
routinely given. In charting their evolving relationship with the Roman Empire, one can see the 
roots of the world that comes after - the cunning, Byzantine diplomacy, the prevalence of steppe 
peoples, and the closer integration of the western steppes with the soon to be Islamic Near 
Eastern world. That world would be inconceivable without the ebb and flow of Turco-Roman 
relations. 
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Methodology and Historiography 
A reconstructed narrative of the Turco-Roman alliance is not untrod ground. Among the 
most detailed is that of Harry Turtledove· s 1977 account, which focuses on the first phase of the 
alliance under Justin II and Tiberius. Unfortunately, its age puts it at a substantial disadvantage, 
as it does not account for many of the developments in both Roman and Inner Asian scholarship 
over the intervening 44 years. Compounding that issue (and emblematic of its date), Turtledove 
is exclusively reliant on written sources and tends to let himself be led by their biases, most 
evident in his uncritical acceptance of Menander Protector's topoi-ridd!ed portrayal of 
Tourxanthos. 3 His ultimate conclusion, that the alliance with the Turks "more trouble than it was 
worth," merely another one of Justin's "'follies," is built on these unsteady foundations, and must 
be reappraised.4 And, most fundamentally, Turtledove is working solely from a Roman 
perspective and thus evaluates only the Roman perception of it. 
Fortunately, however, there have also been complimentary approaches from the opposite 
direction, that is, examining the Turco-Roman alliance from the Turkic perspective. The most 
notable are those presented in Peter Golden's Introduction to the History of'the Turkic Peoples 
and Denis Sinor's "Establishment and Dissolution of'the Turk Empire." Sinor's piece remains 
the best coherent narrative available, however, he is hampered by many interpretational 
eccentricities - most notably in his steadfast refusal to match Greek renderings of Turkic names 
with logical counterparts, often resulting in claims that the Romans were negotiating with 
underlings, not Khagans. 5 This results in an unnecessary weakening of the diplomatic contacts 
3 Harry Turtledove, "The Immediate Successors of Justinian." (PhD Diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 
1977), 162-165. 
4 Turtledove, "Immediate Successors," 166-68. 
5 Denis Sinor, "The Establishment and Dissolution of the Turk Empire," in The Cambridge History of Ea riv Inner 
Asia, ed.Denis Sinor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 301-05, 308-10 .. 
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between Turks and Romans and is frankly unsupported by the evidence. Much of this is 
corrected by the brilliant linguistic detective work of Golden, who gives the most reliable set of 
reconstructed personages available. 6 Unfortunately, botb have the same weakness, namely their 
being rather short. As a result, both rely on summary and generalization. There is considerable 
room for expansion on the themes and ideas that they develop, especially when integrated more 
fully with Roman scholarship. 
As with any treatment of diplomatic history, the foundation of this study must come from 
the written sources. When dealing witb the late sixth and early seventh centuries, this 
necessitates the reliance on a smattering of mostly fragmentary evidence. Fortunately, despite the 
paucity, what written sources we do have focus on diplomacy to a degree unusual in ancient and 
medieval history-writing. In part, this can be attributed to many being preserved in the 
compilations of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, but not all of the sources are found there, and 
indeed many are not even Greek. Thus, we should rather take the emphasis on diplomacy in the 
extant sources as a reflection of the times - times in which the intricate diplomatic negotiations 
of the great empires were rightly considered centrally important to the broader history. 
Unsurprisingly, most of our sources from the Roman perspective are written in Greek, 
although it would be reductive and misleading to simply group these together. In fact, the Greek 
historical tradition of the period contains two distinct bodies of history. The first and most 
directly applicable to diplomatic history is the classicizing tradition embodied by writers such as 
Menander Protector and Theophylact Simocatta. Writing in a strict tradition stretching as far 
back as Thucydides, these historians emphasize state-level warfare, external diplomacy, and 
above all the actions of important individuals. Despite the obvious limitations of such an 
6 Peter Golden, An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, l 992), 127-131, 135. 
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approach, it is these sources that provide us with reliable, foundational insight into diplomatic 
negotiations, owing to the authors' proximity to the imperial court.7 On the other hand are the 
ecclesiastical historians, much more numerous and often anonymous or pseudonymous. These 
histories obviously focus more on the affairs of the church, but such a focus entails a bottom-up 
perspective and a localized history that can often fill the gaps left by the broader classicizing 
histories. 
Most non-Greek sources of the Near East, coming from the Armenian and Syriac 
traditions, fall into the latter category. These sources become particularly crucial later, as the 
Greek tradition shrinks. However, even from the beginning, they provide an altogether unique 
insight into the arena of the Near East, often being more direct witnesses than Greek-writers to 
the effects of diplomatic ebb-and-flow (as was the aforementioned case with Movses 
Kagankatvac'i). Oftentimes, the proximity to the frontiers ensured that these writers had a closer 
proximity to the Turks and a greater understanding of steppe nomads in general, a fact that, when 
combined with the lessened reliance on classical topoi, can render them more reliable than Greek 
writers. 
On the subject of the Turks, the written sources applicable to them are ofa rather 
different nature. Unfortunately for posterity, this era's Turks lacked a writing system, with the 
first epigraphic evidence appearing in the eighth century and manuscripts coming even later. 8 As 
shall be demonstrated, the period of these writings is markedly different from the period here 
covered - so much so that retrojecting these later sources must be done cautiously, provisionally, 
7 For examples of this proximity, see the biographical treatments in Menander the Guardsman, The Histo1y qf 
Mcnandff the Guardsman, trans. R. C. Blocklcy (Trowbridge, 'Wiltshire: Francis Cairns, 1985), l -5; and 
Theophylact Simocatta The J!isto1y of Theophylacl Simocatla, trans. Michael Whtiby and Mary Whitby (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 1986), xiii-xvii. 
8 For a concise overview of written Early Turkic, see Golden, Introduction, 151-52. 
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and always with a great deal of supporting evidence. It would be foolish to deny that the lack of 
written evidence is a problem. We will never hear the Turks of this period truly speak in their 
own voice. However, a careful examination of external sources can mitigate this problem 
somewhat. Particularly noteworthy here are the Chinese sources, especially those of the so-called 
·'Standard Histories'' compiled in the Tang period. which arc generally very concerned with the 
Turks. 9 Like the classicizing Greek sources, the Chinese ··Standard" or "Orthodox" tradition is a 
very old tradition that docs not lack for topoi and limited perspective. But they provide an 
unmatched insight into Turkic internal politics and tell another half of the story of Turkic 
diplomacy with settled peoples. 
Crucially, however, these written sources cannot and will not be considered in a vacuum. 
The archaeological record is of extensive usefulness in supplementing and verifying surviving 
writings. Clearly, archaeology can tell us nothing about the discussions between Roman and 
Turkic envoys. However, it can tell us a great deal about what they referred to. Archaeology 
becomes exceedingly important when reconstructing the Turks' culture and history, given the 
lack of textual evidence. So too does the distribution of Turkic and Sasanian coins allow for a 
speculative reconstruction of the changes on the Sasanians' eastern frontier. Numismatic 
evidence is also particularly revelatory in uncovering the Turks presentation of their universalist 
ideology and worldview ~ necessary additions to the rather limited perspective of our written 
sources. In tum, the written sources imbue archaeology and numismatics with a context and 
meaning than they would otherwise lack. As such, the synthesis of these two disparate elements 
can give us a much fuller view of Turco-Roman relations. 
9 Endymion Porter Wilkinson, Chinese Histo1)': A New ll1anual (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 
818-26. 
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That spirit of synthesis applies equally to this work's treatment of the historiography- or, 
more accurately, historiographies. Turco-Roman history is truly Eurasian, taken together, the 
two empires stretch from Spain to Korea. As such, any work that claims to construct a 
comprehensive narrative of their relations will need to integrate a substantial number of 
historiographies from across the Eurasian continent(s). With that said, given their centrality to 
the topic, a few must be given an especial focus. The first is the historiography of the Later 
Roman Empire. There is certainly no lack of historical writing on the Late Roman and Byzantine 
world, in spite of the relative dearth of evidence. Indeed, diplomatic history has become 
increasingly prevalent, often with a particular focus on diplomacy and Roman-Sasanian 
relations. 10 
However, rarely are Turco-Roman relations highlighted as being of particular import in 
this period, an error that the present work seeks to rectify. Often, they are given a cursory 
mention, lacking sufficient explanation of their importance. For example, Dignas and Winter's 
discussion of the Turks simply states that Justin II attempted to secure an alliance with them and 
moves on, further mentioning the Turks only as a distraction for the Sasanians. 11 The later Turkic 
alliance (or "'Chazar" alliance, as they follow Movses and other sources with that incomplete 
identification) is mentioned only in passing, not as a decisive factor in the last great war of 
antiquity. 12 Indeed, it is quite rare to see the alliance considered such. The great exception is 
James Howard-Johnston, who (owing to his familiarity with Annenian sources like Movses) has 
long championed the Turks as among the deciding factors in the Roman victory. 13 His 
10 See e.g., The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars, Part II: AD 363-630 ed. Geoffrey Greatrex and 
Samuel N.C. Lieu (London: Routledge, 2002); Beate Dignas and Engelbert Winter, Rome and Persia in Late 
Antiquity: Neighbars and Rivals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
11 Dignas and Winter, Rome and Persia, 41-42. 
12 Dignas and Winter, Rome and Persia, 46. 
1
~ James Howard-Johnston, ''Heraclius' Persian Campaigns and the Revival of the East Roman Empire.'' War in 
Histo,y 6 (1999): 40-42. 
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argumentation is very convincing and closely examined below, but it can be expanded and given 
a great deal of additional context when synthesized with the full history of Turco-Roman 
relations behind it. 
The second body of scholarship is, naturally, the that which studies the Turkic Khaganate 
itself. Again, there is no dearth ofresearch on this topic (although it is perhaps less well-known 
than Later Roman history). Mostly, however, the work is being done from a philological 
perspective, rather than a historical one concerned with constructed nanatives. That approach has 
been exceedingly fruitful and has led to some excellent scholarship that is absolutely 
foundational for this work. For example, Michael R. Drompp's work in this area has provided as 
thorough an understanding of internal Turkic affairs as can be expected, a necessity when 
accounting for their motivations in diplomacy. 14 However, this hyper-focus often comes at the 
expense of larger-scale, diachronic historical events such as diplomatic nanative. 
There are exceptions to the specificity, but often they are surveys which cannot afford to 
thoroughly examine a specific topic such as Turco-Roman diplomacy. 15 Very often, these works 
place the First Turkic Khaganate within the broader realm of Inner Asian History (that is, 
principally, the history of China's northern frontier). as Barfield does in defining the Turks in 
terms of their relationship with China. 16 That approach is reasonable, valid, and has proven 
highly fecund. However, this work takes a different tack, in examining the First Turkic 
Khaganate's affairs outside the Inner Asian heartlands and as a player in world history, using the 
same methods that have been used in examining Turkic relations with China. In so doing, it 
14 Michael R. Drompp, Supernumerary Sovereigns: Superfluidity and Mutability in the Elite Power Structure of the 
Early Turks (Tu-jue)," in Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphe1y, eds. Gary Seaman 
and Daniel Marks (Los Angeles: Ethnographics Press, University of Southern California, 1991), 44-115; and 
Michael R. Drompp, "Imperial State Formation in Inner Asia: The Early Turkic Empires (6th to 9th Centuries)," 
Acta Orienta/ia Academia Scientarum Hungaricae 58 (2005): 101-11. 
15 Golden, Introduction is a prominent example. 
16 Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier (Cambridge, MA Basil Blackwell, 1989), 85-127. 
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hopes to add to the understanding of Turkic and Inner Asian history as well. The relationship 
with the Romans was crucial to the western part of the Khaganate, and a more thorough 
understanding thereof holds the promise of better explaining this more enigmatic half. 
The revised approach of this work was decisively influenced by the third major 
historiob>raphy, that of the Sasanians. In recent times, Sasanian historiography has been swept by 
a "reorientation" of the Sasanian world east, emphasizing the importance of the Eastern frontier 
to an equal if not greater degree than the better-documented Western (Roman) one. 17 Naturally, 
this would imply a greater level of significance for the Turkic Khaganate in Sasanian affairs than 
has often been regarded by more Western-centric histories. However, even here, many scholars 
have not fully accounted for the importance of the Turks. Parvaneh Pourshariati, in her otherwise 
excellent Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire, largely ignores the Turks in explaining the 
Sasanians' demise. 18 Her thesis focuses, convincingly, on the internal collapse of the Parthian-
Sasanian confederacy. 19 But she unfortunately neglects to account for the presence of an external 
stressor- namely the Turks - who played a major role in fomenting the collapse of the 
confederacy she describes. 
Despite the many wonderful advances they have made, all three of these historiographies 
have significant flaws in their treatment of Turco-Roman relations. At the root of the flaws is the 
lack of significant contact between the works of scholars in these ostensibly separate worlds. The 
Turco-Roman alliance, at the nexus point of all three, represents a singularly important case in 
17 See, e.g., Khodadad Rezakhani, ReOrienting the Sasanians: East Iran in Late Antiquity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2017); Sasanian Persia: Betiveen Rome and the Steppes of Eurasia ed. Eberhard Sauer 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019): Richard Payne. "The Making ofTuran: The Fall and 
Transformation of the Iranian East in Late Antiquity," Journal of Late Antiquity 9 (2016): 4-41: and Parvaneh 
Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab Conquest 
of Iran (London: LB. Tauris, 2017), the latter of which has an extensive bibliography of Sasanian historiography. 
18 The only major coverage of Turks comes with her account ofBahram Chobin, Pourshariati, Decline and Fall, 
400-410. 
19 Pourshariati, Decline and Fall, 2-6. 
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which they must work in tandem. Thus, a new, thoroughgoing account of the Turco Roman 
alliance, as this work aspires to be, necessitates an assimilation of these disparate works. 
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Section One: The Roman "Status Quo" of the Mid-61" Century 
In order to understand Turco-Roman relations, it is vital to first establish the status quo -
the scene which the Turks burst into when they sent a delegation to Constantinople in 563. The 
only problem with this is that the 6th century is one of the most dynamic and fluid periods in 
Roman history, in addition to being fairly well-documented (at least compared to the 5th and 7th )_ 
As such, any attempt to summarize the events and draw out general trends and themes will 
necessarily only scratch the surface. Thus, what follows is only intended as a primer prior to the 
narrative of Turco-Roman diplomacy, with an especial focus on those elements which will be 
relevant to the development thereof. 
The arrival of the Turks on the Western Steppes corresponds with the terminal period of 
the reign of Justinian, a period which Michael Maas rather prosaically describes as 
"disappointing. "20 In a peripeteia worthy of Herodotus, the whole world seemed to tum against 
the regime. Perhaps the most devastating event was the much-discussed plague outbreak of 542, 
which wreaked havoc on the Roman economy and paralyzed the empire by infecting Justinian 
himself.21 Equally devastating on a personal and political level was the death of Theodora in 548. 
It is doubtful that the 548-49 conspiracy of Artabanes and his allies (in which a number of 
Byzantine and Armenian aristocrats plotted to replace Justinian with his cousin Gerrnanos) was 
unrelated to these weaknesses. Though as Procopius himself admits, the plot "came to 
nothing,'m it serves as an illustration of the cracking foundation of the Justinianic settlement. It 
20 Michael Maas, '"Roman Questions, Byzantine Answers: Contours of the Age of Justinian." in The Cambridge 
Companion to the Age of Justinian, ed. Michael Maas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9-10. 
21 Much has been written on the plague itself and its consequences. For a good overview, see Peregrine Harden 
"Mediterranean Plague in the Age of Justinian" in The Cambridge Companion, 134-160: for a catastrophist 
argument for the continuing importance of the plague throughout Late Antiquity, see Plague and the End<~( 
Antiquity ed. Lester K. Little (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
n Procopius, Wars, 7 .31. 
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is telling that this is the first major challenge to Justinian's rule mentioned by Procopius since the 
Nika Riots of some seventeen years earlier. The 550s continued tbc trend with an unremitting 
barrage of natural disasters. In an almost painfully poetic moment, the very dome of the Hagia 
Sophia, which Peter N. Bell has aptly called "ideology in stone,"23 cracked and eventually 
collapsed in 557, according to John Malalas.24 
However, it is important not to overstate the bleakness of this period. One must not 
simply take Procopius at face value, particularly when he claims that a trillion people were killed 
by Justinian's policy in the same breath. 25 Even the plague, as devastating as it was, was 
probably not the absolute demographic tailspin our written sources might imply.26 The Roman 
Empire was still the dominant power and Constantinople was still the navel of the world. 
Particularly from an outside perspective, an alliance with Rome was an incredibly attractive 
option. 
Still, Justinian's western affairs, once the pride of his propaganda machine, had indeed 
soured. Agathias accuses Justinian of having '"wearied of vigorous policies" in his old age and of 
allowing the legions to degrade. 27 Equally likely, however, was that the nigh constant warfare 
and expansion had sapped the empire itself of strength. The wars with the barbarian kingdoms of 
the west turned against the Romans, with the desultory warfare in Italy a particularly grisly 
example. Most strikingly, at least for Agathias, a combined Hun-Slavic raiding party reached the 
walls of Constantinople, defeated only by Belisarius' emergence from retiremcnt. 28 But the most 
23 Peter N. Bell, Social Conflict in the Age of Justinian: Its Nature Management and Mediation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 319. 
24 John Malalas, Chronicle, 18,489. 
25 Procop. Secret History, 18. 
26 For a revisionist reading
1 
relying particularly on archaeology and DNA, see Lee Mordechai and Merle Eisenberg, 
"Rejecting Catastrophe: The Case of the Justinianic Plague," Past & Present 244 (2019): 3-50. 
27 Agath. 5.14. 1. 
28 As narrated in Agath. 5.15-20. 
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relevant event to the present discussion is the coming of the A vars to the Roman periphery after 
fleeing the rising Turkic power in the east. 29 Though they may not have known it at the time, this 
marks the first connection between the Turkic Khaganate and the Roman Empire. 
The best account of their arrival comes from Menander Protector. The Avars arrived 
among the Caucasian Alans sometime in the late 550s. 30 Almost immediately, the A vars sent an 
envoy to Constantinople, demanding "the most valuable gifts, yearly payments, and very fertile 
land to inhabit" in order to render the ·•invincible" A vars "well-disposed'' to the Romans. 31 In 
accordance with his earlier policy, 32 Justinian agreed to these requests, rather than facing the 
hostilities of yet another barbarian tribe. Presumably, the gifts were easy enough to manage; the 
real issue was the land. Justinian attempted to settle the A vars in Pannonia Secunda (roughly the 
northern part of modem Serbia), probably aiming to play them against the Gepids of the 
Pannonian Plain, as Blockley intelligently notes. 33 Indeed, Menander praises Justinian for 
similarly using them to "crush'' the other tribes of the region on their way from Alania to the 
Danube. 34 
All was not well, however, and the abortive alliance broke down. Menander attributes 
this breakdown to a personal conference between an A var envoy and the Byzantine official 
revealing A var treachery, 35 although one suspects that this is a classic case of a Greek historian 
reducing broader issues to an individual level. Certainly, Menander also mentions that the A vars 
29 See Below, Section Two. 
·19 There exists some debate over the dating. Compare the dating of 557/8 given in Walter Pohl. The Avars. A Steppe 
Empire in Central Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 21-23; against the 559/60 dating given m 
R.C. Blackley, The History of Menander the Guardsman (Liverpool: Francis Cairns, 1985), 252-53, n. 19. The 
difference is somewhat trivial for the present discussion, so I shall avoid presenting a specific year(s). 
11 Men. Prat. Fr. 5,1. 
.n Cf. the settling of the Lombards in Procop. Wars, 7.34, for example. 
33 Blackley, History, 253, n. 28. 
34 Men. Prat. Fr. 5,2. 
35 Men. Prot. Fr. 5,4. 
-•-••••• c •••"•~·- • - e.,-;>-'4•-•, v·~•- -• _ ••••~. •----------•ll-•-,.,••~"•••'••.-~-"'~-•·~•••------,.-a-,..,..,..,._,u,,,~c-,·••--,•,c -••· •~·,,,, ••••~••-,,"""s--• 
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were dissatisfied with the land offer, preferring a location in Scythia Minor (roughly 
corresponding with modern Dobruja in Romania and Bulgaria) which was rejected by the 
Romans. 36 Perhaps this disagreement spoiled the alliance. In any case, the alliance collapsed, and 
Justinian held the A var envoys as hostages to ensure their remaining north of the Danube. From 
here on, the A vars remained a liquid, hostile factor on the northwest frontier, until eventually 
coming to rest on the Pannonian Plain after the removal of the Gepids and migration of the 
Lombards. 37 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the Romans' interactions with the A vars. Many 
are quite general; Walter Pohl correctly notes that the Romans' "procedure was in no way 
exceptional."38 Thus, the example of the A vars can be used to draw larger conclusions about 
Roman-Steppe people relations. While there was certainly no prescribed policy towards Steppe 
peoples, the Romans nonetheless fell back on a number of stratagems when it came to dealing 
with them. First and foremost was the tendency to play them off each other, in the hopes that 
doing so would distract from raids on Roman territory and prevent the formation of a larger 
polity. As a further part of this management, the Romans were highly concerned with controlling 
the movements of these nomadic groups, often attempting to settle them in particular areas 
conducive to Roman interest. 
Equally important, however, is the fact that these stratagems very often failed, as they did 
in the case of the Avars. Rather than managing the frontier. Justinian's policies ultimately 
resulted in the creation of an A var Empire in Pannonia - a genuine existential threat to the 
empire - although his death spared him from dealing with the consequences. Nevertheless, the 
16 Men. Prat. Fr. 5,4; For the identification of Menander's vague Scythia Minor, see Blackley, Histo,y, 253, n. 28. 
37 For a much more detailed account of the Avars in this period see Pohl, A vars, 21-68. 
38 Pohl, A vars, 22. 
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Romans will draw from the same playbook when dealing with the Turks, although with very 
different results. More particularly, in dealing with the Avars, the Romans had unwittingly 
poisoned relations with the Turkic Khaganate before negotiations had even be6'Un. 
It is very difficult to spin the developments western frontier as good. The East, however, 
was far more ambivalent. The so-called Eternal Peace, signed with the Sasanians in 532, had 
lasted scarcely eight years. In the summer of 540, the Sasanians invaded Roman Mesopotamia. 
Procopius attributes the breakdown to the conniving of a Gothic king, 39 but the account of a 
similar near-war caused by a dispute among Arabs makes it seem as though Khusro was spoiling 
for an excuse to war with the now-distracted Romans. 40 Initially, that war was indeed disastrous 
for the Romans, with the sacking of Antioch a particularly damaging blow. 41 However, the war 
quite quickly turned desultory; despite constant fighting, neither side could gain the decisive 
advantage. By 545, a truce was signed on the Mesopotamian front, although the war would 
continue on in Lazica well into the 550s. Finally, a full truce was signed in 557. 
The negotiations for a forn1al peace carried on until 562. Fortunately, a thorough account 
of that treaty survives in Menander Protector. Central to the treaty is the resolving the disputes 
throughout the frontier, most notably the fortifications at Daras, which the Persians "shall not 
complain to the Romans about," although the Romans were not allowed to station "a large force. 
beyond what is adequate to the town."42 Most relevant to Turkic diplomacy, the treaty also 
concerns the movement of traders and merchants across the borders. Crucially, that control of 
movement equally applies to "barbarian merchants of either state" who "shall not travel by 
39 Procop., Wars, 2.2-3. 
40 Geoffrey Greatrex and Samuel N.C. Lieu, The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars Part II: AD 363-
630 (London: Routledge, 2002), 102. 
41 An account of the sack is given in the Syriac life ofS,vmeon Stylites Junior 57, reproduced in Greatrex and Lieu 
Roman Eastern Frontier, 104-05. 
42 Men. Prot., Fr. 6, I. 
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strange roads but shall go by Nisibis and Daras."43 By this provision, trade envoys from, say, the 
Turkic Khaganate, should have to pass through the entrcp6ts on the Roman-Sasanian border. 
Failure to do so would violate the tcnns of the peace. 
It is easy to discount the peace of 562, given that it collapses only ten years later. But it 
was not simply a piece of paper that both sides planned to disregard the moment a war became 
advantageous again. As pointed out by Dignas and Winter, the peace of 562 "was a serious 
attempt to find a comprehensive solution to all controversial topics. ''44 There was even a 
provision that gave a complicated process for resolving the sort of border community disputes 
that are used by "godless men ... [to] provide a pretext for war.''45 In order to ensure clarity and 
avoid misinterpretation, a team of twelve interpreters were assigned to review the translation. 46 
All signs point to the fact that this treaty was intended to last for the fifty years it stipulated. As 
such, it comes the closest to being the elusive "status quo" for the mid-6th century. That status 
quo was one of considerable parity between the Romans and Sasanians. The treaty of 562 is 
clearly a negotiation between two powers on an even par. One year later, the first Turkic 
delegation would arrive in Constantinople. 
"Men. Prat., Fr. 6,1. 
44 Beate Dignas and Engelbert Winter: Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity: 1Veighbours and Rivals (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 148. 
~5 Men. Prot., Fr. 6, 1: It is unclear whether the cited passage was a part of the treaty or a digression by Menander. 
For discussion, see Blockley, Histo,y, 258, n.60. 
46 Dignas and Winter, Rome and Persia, 144. 
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Section Two: The Coming of the Turkic Khaganate 
The Turks first enter the historical record in the mid-sixth century. Presumably, of course, 
they preexisted this for some time - and much ink has been spilled in determining their origins 
and Urheimat; as Peter Golden notes, it remains an open question.47 We can be fairly confident 
in saying that they were ironworkers (a fact which will become important in their gift-giving) 
and that they were among the most prominent vassals of their predecessor empire, the Rouran 
Khaganate; these two factors are likely related, given the importance of iron to warfare.48 
Practically everything else is up for debate. It may well be, as Golden speculates, that the true 
ethnogenesis of the Turks came only with the process ofstate-fonnation- certainly, this would 
not be unique in Inner Asian history. 49 
In any case, the leaders of the Turks were the Ashina Clan and the first member of the 
clan reported in history is Bumin. Under Bumin, the Turks played a leading role in suppressing 
the internal dissent plaguing the collapsing Rouran Khaganate then under the rulership of Anagui 
(r. 520-552). According to the Chinese sources, Bumin broke out in revolt from his liege when 
Anagui refused his request for a royal marriage alliance. 50 One learns to be skeptical of this sort 
of personalization in ancient sources, both Chinese and Classical, but the singular importance of 
marriage-alliances in Inner Asian societies makes it far from impossible. Demonstrative of that 
fact is the marriage ofBumin to a princess of the Western Wei 51 shortly thereafter. Utilizing the 
alliance with the Wei and the weaknesses of the Rouran state, Bumin quickly defeated the 
47 Golden, Introduction, 126. 
48 Sinor, "Establishment," 295-97. 
49 Golden, Introduction, 126-27. 
50 Drompp, "Imperial State Formation," I 03-04. 
51 The \Vei were a dynasty ofSinicized clan of the Inner Asian steppes. These events occur during a rather chaotic 
and dynamic period in Chinese history, the precise narrative of which is outside of the scope here. For an overview 
of the period with a particular emphasis on Inner Asian relations, see Barfield, Perilous, 85-127. 
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Rouran and rose to supremacy over their lands by 552. Unfortunately for him, he died shortly 
thereafter. 
Roughly contemporary with the death of Bumin, his brother, Ishtemi, began a push into 
the west. Though the sources report that he was following the fleeing Rouran, 52 it is a reasonable 
surmise that he was also motivated by economic factors, given that the west (particularly the 
region now known as Turkestan - not to be confused with its subdivision, Turkmenistan) 
contained the main urban centers of the silk trade. 53 Whatever the reason, this was a remarkable 
decision. Prior empires, like the Xiongnu, had developed influence in Turkestan, often extracting 
revenue from local merchant princes. 54 But they had never directly controlled the western 
regions; the Turks were the first, and only the Mongols would repeat it. In so doing, Ishtemi put 
the Turks into direct contact with the Roman Empire, and he is likely the Silziboulos mentioned 
in the first mission to Constantinople. 55 
However, the expansion of the Turkic Khaganate was soon met by the dominant power 
already in the region - the Hephthalites. The Hephthalites were themselves a nomadic Inner 
Asian people, who had built a powerful, Bactrian-centered empire on the eastern borders of Iran 
and extending as far east as the Tarim Basin. 56 Fortunately for the Turks, they found a powerful 
ally in a Sasanian Iran under the leadership of Khosrow I Anushirvan - among the most 
52 S6ren Stark, "Ti.i.rk Khaganatc," in Encyclopedia of Empire, ed. John M. McKenzie et al. (Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2016), 2129. 
53 Golden hypothesizes thus in Introduction, 127; sec below for the importance of the silk trade to the Turkic 
Khaganate. 
54 Barfield, Perilous, 48-49. 
55 Such an identification has been questioned (see Sinor. "Establishment," 302-03), but Golden argues for the 
identification persuasively, Introduction, 127. 
sci A full examination of The Hephthalites is outside the scope of this volume. Despite its brevity, the overview 
offered in Khodadad Rezakhani, ReOrient,ng the Sasanians: East Iran in Late Antiquity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2017), 125-146, is the best introduction: B.A. Litvinsky, "The Hephthalite Empire," in His/on· of 
Civilizations in Central Asia, vol. 3, The Crossroads of Civilizations AD 250-750, eds. B.A. Litvinsky et al. (Paris: 
UNESCO Publishing, 1990), 135-162. is outdated and short on analysis. but it provides a great deal of useful 
archaeological evidence. 
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mythologized and celebrated of all Iranian rulers. It is thus unsurprising that, as Touraj Daryaee 
notes, "it is quite difficult to determine fact from fiction'' in his rule. 57 This fact is well-reflected 
in the evidence of the Turco-Sasanian alliance. The sources are unanimous in reporting this anti-
Hephthalite coalition, but our most detailed account comes from the Shahnameh. Certainly, the 
source is not without its problems, not least of which is in identifying the Turks as "Chinese," 
although the events and name Sinjibu (Ishtemi) clearly mark them as the Western Turks. 58 
However, it more than makes up for its deficiencies in the insights a careful reading could offer. 
According to the Shahnameh, war broke out between the Turks and Hephthalites when 
the Hephthalites murdered a Turk ambassador bound for Iran. lfthis is indeed true, it would be a 
remarkable demonstration of the proactivity of Turkic diplomacy. Given the fact that we know 
from Menander Protector that the Turks also initiated contact with the Romans, the idea that they 
would do the same with the Sasanians is reasonable. It is equally intriguing that the Turks 
proceeded to war without securing that alliance. Far from the hammer-and-anvil, two-front 
strategy often presented in the literature, the Turks defeated the Hephthalites on their own at the 
Battle of Gol-Zarriun and had even reached a peace agreement. It was only after this victory that 
the Sasanians brought forces into the region, whereupon the Turks beseeched them for an 
alliance, cemented with the exchange of royal brides. The boundary line seems to have been the 
Oxus. The Shahnameh is explicit in stating that Ishtemi saw his daughter only to the Oxus, 59 but 
this could be taken as mere poetic license were it not for solid archaeological evidence for 
Sasanian occupation up to the Oxus and no further. 60 
57 Touraj Daryaee. Sasanian Persia: The Rise and Fall ofan Empire (London: J.B. Tauris, 2009), 29. 
58 Rezakhani, ReOrienting, 141-42. 
59 Abolqasem Ferdowsi, Shahnameh: The Persian Book of Kings, trans. and ed. by Dick Davis (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2016), 805-806. 
60 Rezakhani, ReOrienting, 176-78. 
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This is a fine story, evinced by its inclusion in the Shahnameh, but it also tells us a great 
deal about Turkic diplomacy more broadly. First, the Turks are the agents in initiating diplomacy 
- a role which they will continue to play with the Roman Empire and had already played with the 
Wei. Second is the imp011ance of marriage alliances and gift giving as tools of diplomacy, 
which, again, was visible with the Wei. Both were basic aspects of Turkic diplomatic language 
and the diplomatic language of Late Antique Eurasia more broadly, although the Romans will 
not lack for hang-ups about the fonncr. Third, the Turks defeated the Hcphthalites alone and 
aligned with the Sasanians only for the cleanup operation in partitioning the Hephthalite empire. 
That might suggest something that might be reinforced by their earlier conduct. Rather than the 
expected explanation of the alliance as a military function, necessary to defeat an equal or 
superior foe, the Turks used alliances to build a frontier settlement after the main events of the 
war - a pattern which will reappear. 
Of course, as soon as the Hephthalites were reduced into rump principalities, the 
Sasanian-Turkic accord collapsed. Their alliance was built on a common enemy, and now that 
the Turks had come to occupy the same space, the two were natural enemies ( although one 
wonders what the respective royal brides thought of it). More precise narrative detail will be 
given below, but it suffices for our purpose here to say that after a brief defeat, the Turks pushed 
into the lands south of the Oxus up to the Iranian Plateau. 61 Certainly by about 580, the Western 
Turkic Khaganatc was established in the shape it would hold until the Tang invasion. 
But the Hephthalites were far from the only major conquest of this early period. The 
Turks also pushed much further west, into the heartlands of the Pantie-Caspian Steppe. Owing to 
the paucity of evidence - both documentary and archaeological - left in this region, it is 
61 The documentary record is here reinforced by archaeology, see Rezak.bani, ReOrienting, 176-81. 
Melvin 24 
impossible to establish dates or events with any precision. However, what is clear is that the 
Turks had established their rule over the Volga regions (with admittedly some resistance) by 
about 571, giving us a terminus ante quern with which to work. 62 As we already know that the 
A vars, expelled by and fleeing the advance of the Turks came onto the Pantie-Caspian steppe by 
558 at the earliest, we can establish that as a terminus post quern. 
However, in addressing this issue of the A vars, we have stumbled into one of the great 
questions of the historiography, which cannot go unaddressed here, seeing as "the A var 
problem" will be among the defining issues in Turco-Roman diplomacy. Put simply, the question 
is: were the Avars who appear in the Caucasus the same as the Rouran ovetihrown by the Turks? 
Certainly, the name A var and its variations were applied to the Rourans,63 and the pattern of an 
overthrown elite migrating west is one well-established in the Inner Asian tradition. So it should 
be an easy answer, but it is complicated by the testimony ofTheophylact Simocatta. Probably 
acting upon information given by the Turks themselves, Theophylact reports that the people 
known to the West as Avars are in fact Pseudo-A vars, wholly different peoples, called the Vara 
and Chunni, who had stolen the name from the prior overlords of the Turks. 64 It would be easy to 
dismiss the excursus out of hand, the product of a negative animus to the A vars at the time of 
their siege of Constantinople, but, as Walter Pohl points out, his infonnation is far too good to 
dismiss whole cloth. 65 
Regardless, the tendency has been to disregard Theophylact's account, given the 
preponderance oflinguistic evidence. In the words of Peter Golden, the leading scholar in the 
62 As reported in Menander and dated by Golden, Introduction, 129-130. 
,.1 Peter B. Golden, ·'Some Notes of the A vars and Rouran;· in The Steppe Lands and the Worlds Beyond Them: 
Studies in Honor of Victor Spinei on his 70111 BirthdaJ', ed. Florin Curta and Bogdan-Petru Maleion (Ia~i: Editura 
Universitatii Alexandru loan Cuza, 2013), 43-66, provides the best overview of the linguistic evidence. 
"'Theophylact S1mocatta, Ifisto1y o(Theophvlact Simocatta, trans. Michael and Mary Whitby (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 1986), 188-93, provides the text of the excursus alongside much needed commentary and notes. 
65 Pohl, A vars, 41-42. 
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field of early Turkic history, "the 'Pseudo-A vars' may be safely removed from historical 
analysis."66 However, scholars like Etienne de la Vaissiere and Walter Pohl have rightly 
modified that argument to include the likelihood that there were indeed non-Rouran elements in 
the A vars. For one thing, the archaeology does not match, although material culture is not 
necessarily the best predicter. 67 More importantly, we also have reports from the Chinese sources 
that the ruling Rourans actually came to China, rather than launching into a mad dash for tcrra 
incognita. 68 The most likely explanation to account for all of these discrepancies is that the A vars 
were in fact an amalgam of many disenfranchised groups, including some remnants of the 
Rouran, who took the most prestigious name among them. 69 Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, 
"A vars'' will here refer only to those people who came to rest in Pannonia and "Rouran" to the 
Inner Asian Khaganate. 
Perhaps most interesting, for our purposes, is the fact that it was the Turks themselves 
who actually caused this whole mess. In their many, many complaints to the Romans about the 
A vars, the Turks do not refer to them as Rouran, but U arkhonitai, the name which Theophylact 
uses as a premise for his excursus. 70 The A vars are not framed to the Romans as the former 
rulers of the Turks, but as their slaves, some among the many slave tribes subject to the Khagan. 
When lshtemi boasts that he shall follow them, he does so not to avenge their former subjugation 
of the Turks, but out of outrage that his rightful subjects have left. 71 There are thus two 
possibilities: either the Turks did not consider the A vars to be the same as the Rouran, or they 
had a reason to present to the Romans otherwise. It could merely be the case that to admit that 
66 Golden, "'Notes;· 65. 
''
7 Pohl, Avars, 46-47. 
68 Etienne de la Vaissiere, "Theophylact's Turkish Exkurs Revisited,'' in De Samarcande Cl Jstanhul: Etapes 
Orienta/es, ed. Veronique Schiltz (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2015), 115-126. 
69 Pohl, Avars, 45-47; de la Vassierc "'Theophylacfs," 115-126. 
7° For an earlier example, see Menander, Fr. 19.1. 
71 Men. Prat., Fr. 4.2. 
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they were fonnally subject people would undermine their perceived power. But in any case, the 
Turks' lack of acknowledgement of the Rouran-Avar connection lets some air out of the theory 
that their primary motivation was the pursuit of the Rouran. 
Regardless of their motives, the Turks had created a genuine Eurasian empire, 
unchallenged in its scope until the Mongols. What was the Turkic state, so quickly able to 
become a great power? As is almost always the case, understanding the foreign affairs of the 
Turkic Khaganate is impossible without knowing its domestic ones. If anything, the necessity is 
even b>reater with the Turks, as diplomacy is itself a key aspect of their political system. It is thus 
fortunate that we have relatively solid evidence for Turkic statecraft and even more fortunate that 
state formation and maintenance is probably the second most widely discussed and debated issue 
in the historiography, after ethnogenesis. 
Of course, there is another side to that coin - there is a considerable amount of 
controversy surrounding the Turkic state and Inner Asian statecraft more broadly. Ever since the 
pioneering writings of Owen Lattimore, the focus of such discussion has been on economics. 
Lattimore famously defined the Inner Asia-China border more by economic and ecological 
differences than the power of a given state. 72 While Lattimore himself did not apply his principle 
to state-building, Thomas J. Barfield has. On this reading, the nomadic economy is dependent on 
the settled goods available in a powerful, unified China, states and empires are formed as 
supratribal units designed to better extract resources from settled peoples - ·'shadow empires·• as 
Barfield called them. 73 That is to say, that the impetus of nomadic (and indeed Barfield suggests 
72 Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York: American Geographical Society, 1940, repr. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1962), 328-34. 
71 Thomas J. Barfield. "The Shadow Empires: Imperial State formation along the Chinese-Nomad Frontier." in 
Empire: Perspectives_(rom Archaeology and Histo1y, ed. Susan E. Alcock et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 200 I), I 0-41. 
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this is also true of non-Inner Asian nomads) comes from external, not internal factors. 74 The 
Barfield thesis assumes two things. One: that Inner Asian steppe regions are not economically 
capable of supporting a self-sufficient state, and two: that a steppe empire can only rise 
contemporarily with a consolidated Chinese state. 
However, a number of scholars, chief among them Michael R. Drompp and Nicola Di 
Cosmo, have rightly criticized both of these premises, very often using the Turks as the testcase. 
For one thing, there is the obvious fact that the rise of the First Turkic Khaganate does not 
coincide with a powerful Chinese state; in fact. the moments of the Khaganate's greatest 
weakness coincides with a powerful Chinese State. More damning, however, is the fact that 
nomadic states were not economically dependent on independent settled empires. Though it can 
indeed be tempting to be overly schematic in applying Lattimore's ecological dichotomy, there 
were always agriculturalists Ii ving alongside pastoralists throughout much of Inner Asia. 75 Inner 
Asian states existing in heavily agricultural areas exhibit the same characteristics as those 
dependent on pastoralism.76 Inner Asian people were not economically dependent on the separate 
ecology of settled states, but even if they were, as Michael Drompp has pointed out, China was 
far from the only settled power to exploit - as demonstrated by the westward expansion.77 Even 
urbanization, often considered the ultimate distinction from the Chinese world, is extant in Inner 
Asia from the beginning, although naturally in a different form.78 Clearly, the Barfield model is 
insufficient. 
74 Barfield, Perilous Frontier, 5-8. 
75 Nicola Di Cosmo. "Ancient Inner Asian Nomads: Their Economic Basis and Its Significance in Chinese History,'' 
Journal of Asian Studies, 53 (I 994): 1092-1126 is dedicated to demonstrating this fact. 
76 Nicola ·oi Cosmo, "State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History'', Journal of World Histo!}', I 0 
(1999): 13. 
77 Dompp. "Imperial State Formation," 104. 
78 Peter B. Golden, "Courts and Court Culture in the Proto-urban and Urban Developments among the Pre-
Chingissid Turkic Peoples," in Turko-Mongol Rulers, Cities and City life (Leiden: Brill, 2013 ), 22-26, for the 
Turks, see 42-46. 
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So where does that leave the Turkic Khaganate? In his revised periodization, Di Cosmo 
places them as the first of his "trade-tribute empires," that is, an empire whose revenue was 
drawn both from the collection of tribute and from trade - often more from the latter than the 
fonner. 79 This contrasts with prior '"tribute empires" like the Xiongnu and later ··dual 
administration empires" (an integration of sedentary administration and taxation with a nomadic 
structure) like the pre-Khubilai Mongols. 80 In many ways, this characterization is accurate. 
While it might be an overreach to christen an age of Pax Turcica, the Turkic conquest of Eurasia 
did usher in a period of increased trade. 81 The Turks had an extremely close relationship with the 
Sogdian masters of the Silk Road, a fact attested nowhere better than in the Sogdian Maniakh's 
mission to Justin II. In this any many other cases, the diplomatic activity was inextricably tied 
with trade concerns, and, as such, Sogdians were principal arbiters. The redistribution and 
conspicuous consumption ofluxury goods received from trade served as a key component in the 
power of the Ashina Clan.82 
However, a reading which focuses exclusively on trade and tribute is insufficient for the 
Turkic Khaganate. Owing to the Sinological focus of most scholars, the unique contributions of 
the Western regions have been overlooked. While in the east, the Turks adopted much of the 
Rouran system, dating back to the Xiongnu, their Western domains had much more in common 
with the earlier empires of the Hephthalites or the Kushans. Like those two empires, the Western 
Turkic Khaganate was an incredibly diverse political unit, in which pastoral nomads, Sogdian 
merchant princes, Iranian aristocrats, and the builders of the Buddhas of Bamiyan coexisted. 
79 Di Cosmo, ··state Formation," 30-32. 
so Di Cosmo, "State Formation," 29-30, 32-34. 
" Rezakhani, ReOrienting, 176-82. 
82 S6ren Stark, "Luxurious Necessities: Some Observations on Foreign Commodities and Nomadic Polities in 
Central Asia in the Sixth to Ninth Centuries," in Complexity of Interaction Along the Eurasian Steppe Zone in the 
First Millennium CE, ed. Jan Bemmann and Michael Schmauder (Bonn: Vor- und Friihgeschichtliche Archaologie 
Rhcinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Univcrsitat, 20 I 5), 463-502. 
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Richard Payne has argued convincingly for the creation of a new sociopolitical synthesis in the 
region, rooted in the Iranian model, which he (following the Iranian sources) calls Turan. 83 
Fortunately for the Turks, the Hephthalites had done much of the grunt work in building that 
synthesis, and they had themselves been heirs of Sasanian systems. 
Our best evidence comes from Bactria, only conquered by the Turks in the seventh 
century, but the conditions are similar enough along the Iranian border zone to speculate that 
similar systems were in place elsewhere and earlier. In Bactria, the Turks adopted the 
Hephthalite system of a poll tax, tog, and possibly even reintroduced the Sasanian land tax, 
uarg. 84 From the Bactrian perspective, the transition was rather smooth, merely changing the 
adjective from ebodal (Hephthalite) to khaganag (of the Khagan). The Turks, as had the Huns 
and Hcphthalitcs before them, collected these taxes through intermediaries stationed in the cities, 
again continuing an ultimately Iranian tradition. 85 It appears, then, that the Western Khaganate 
had coherent systems of taxation, not tribute or trade, but the orderly, bureaucratic extraction of 
funds from its subjects. 
In addition, the Turco-Sogdian connection went much farther than a simple trade 
relationship. Indeed, at the beginning of the period the Sogdians were not the great masters of the 
silk road that they would become. Prior to the Turks, Sogdiana were among many players in 
Trans-Eurasian trade, certainly a region with increasing potential, but always considered of 
marginal importance by the empires centered in Balkh. 86 The sixth and seventh centuries 
83 Payne, "Making of Turan," 4-6. 
84 Bactrian Documents from Northern Afghanistan 1: legal and Economic Documents, 2nd ed., trans. and ed. 
Nicholas Sims-Williams (London: Nour Foundation, 20 l 2), 74-77: an excellent synthesis of these documents 
focusing on the Hephthalites and Turks can be found in Richard Payne, "Making ofTuran," 13-15, to which the 
present analysis owes a tremendous debt. 
15 Payne, "Making ofTuran," 15-17. 
86 B.I. Marshak and N.N. Negrnatov, "Sogdiana,'' in History a/Civilizations in Central Asia, vol. 3, The Crossroads 
of Civilizations AD 250-750, eds. B.A. Litvmsky et al. (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1990), 234-38. 
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witnessed an explosion of the Sogdian economy and urbanization, manifested in the construction 
of a vast "urban network" throughout the region. 87 Notably, however, these were not merely 
gussied-up trade depots. Rather, they represent an extension of the Turanian city-based 
administration system - the same system used to extract tax through intermediaries. 88 What is 
more, the connections between Turk and Sogdian systems ran even deeper - intermarriage was 
common, which "'facilitated [ the Turks') integration into the aristocratic networks of their 
sedentary counterparts."89 Certainly, this is not enough evidence to suggest that the Turkic state 
was funded primarily with tax, but it does problematize the tribute and trade model of Di Cosmo. 
If anything, the Western Khaganate starts to look more like a later "dual administration" empire, 
ruling hand in glove with its settled population. 
However, the Western Turks were not only a continuation of the Turanian tradition. The 
greatest distinction is the Turkic Khaganate' s expansion west. As has been mentioned, precise 
dates here are hard to come by, but Turkic power had certainly reached the Black Sea by the 
early 560s. Nearly all of this land was inhabited by nomadic pastoralists, and the prior powers of 
Turan had shown no interest in them. Why were the Turks interested? If the sources are taken at 
their word, this is part of the continual pursuit of the Rouran/Avars west. However, this 
explanation is unsatisfactory given what we know about the Rouran flight hypothesis. More 
plausible is the idea that the westward expansion arose from the universal claims of the Turk 
Khagans. 90 We know so little about the area that any theories are conjecture. It is possible, 
however, that the expansion was motivated by the desire to bring more nomadic peoples into the 
87 Etienne de La Vaissiere, Sogdian Traders. A Hist01y (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 112-116. 
88 Payne, "Making of Turan," 16. 
89 Payne, "Making of Turan," 25-26. 
90 Peter B. Golden, "Turks and Iranians: Aspects of Ti.irk and Khazaro-Iranian Interaction," in Turkic-Iranian 
Contact Areas: Historical and Linguistic A.~pects, eds. L. Johanson and C. Bulut (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), 
34-3 7. 
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Western Khaganate's fold, of especial importance considering the nomadic structure of the anny. 
Put simply, the more peoples conquered, the more soldiers available. 
All that is to say that the Turkic Khaganate was unprecedented - a powerful admixture of 
diverse resources and revenue streams, drawing on settled and nomadic peoples alike. However, 
this raises an important question, fundamental to diplomacy and administration alike. How 
united were the Western and Eastern Khaganates? On the one hand, it may not matter a great 
deal; the resources of both Khaganates were great enough to stand alone. But on the other, it 
matters more than any other question about the administration, especially insofar as the 
relationship with Rome is concerned. It is thus unfortunate that the question is incredibly 
difficult to answer. Part of the problem is a change over time; the desultory succession crisis 
which began after the death of Bumin's sons played out between East and West resulting in a 
split in 583, warfare, reconsolidation, and a formal split after Tardush's brief reign as Supreme 
Khagan c. 603. Compounding that problem, however, is the paucity of sources, which makes a 
definitive answer hard to come by. 
As Denis Sinor notes, the tendency in the scholarship has been to emphasize the split 
between West and East, even before the political split at the very end of the sixth century. 91 That 
argument is principally based on both the gigantic size of the Turkic Khaganate and the inherent 
differences between ruling East and West. The Chinese sources make it abundantly clear that 
there are many divisions within the Turk Khaganatc from the beginning, although those divisions 
are far more numerous than the mere bipartite model 92 In this system, the West was ruled by a 
yabghu (or yabghu khagan), a position usually taken to be one step down from the supreme 
khagan. However, these titles are in constant flux, and khagans are also capable of coexisting, 
01 Sinor "Establishment," 305. 
92 Drompp, Michael R. ''Supernumerary Sovereigns,'' 93~95. 
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among other seeming absurdities.93 It is thus important not to be overly schematic in divining 
status and power from titulature, despite the Chinese sources attempts to do so. However, it is 
very notable that the rulers of the Western Turks retain yabghu as their title, even after the 
seemingly straightforward split of 603. Suffice it to say that the partition of the Khaganate was 
far from clean, and never rigidly adhered to. 
Perhaps an explanation for the confusing and ever-changing governance at the highest 
levels of the empire can be found in the nature of Turk rule. The principal method of coherence 
in the Turkic Khaganate was not administrative, i.e. that the supreme khagan sat at the head of a 
system ofleaders, but cultic, i.e. that the supreme khagan was imbued with religious 
significance. A khagan was a fundamentally charismatic leader, whose power arose from his 
connection to heaven, as demonstrated by his qut, a Turkic word that encompasses concepts like 
the vital force ofrulership and supernatural good fotiune. 94 Even more so than the Khagan, 
however, it was the Ashina clan themselves who were the charismatic force intimately connected 
to the Turkic cosmology. 95 That sacredness was compounded by the possession of a holy place -
the Otuken Yz§ - which demonstrated the qut. 96 Thus, the Eastern Khaganate was always the 
sacral heart of the Turkic peoples, powerful not because of its power on Earth, but because of its 
connection to heaven. It is telling that the Western Turks never ceased to send envoys to the East 
for religious ceremonies. 97 
9-' Drompp, "Supernumerary Sovereigns," 92-107 is an excellent account of just how confusing these titles are. 
94 Peter B. Golden, "The Turk Imperial Tradition in the Pre-Chinggisid Era," in Imperial Statecrafi: Political Forms 
and Techniques of Governance in inner Asia, Sixth-Tn·entieth Centuries, ed. David Sneath (Cambridge: Center for 
Asian Studies, 2006), 44-46; as noted therein, the term is in many ways equivalent to the Iranian concept of 
x1-varrah, and may have been influenced by it. 
95 Drompp "Imperial Stale," I 08. 
96 Golden "Tilrk Imperial," 49. 
97 S6ren Stark, "On Oq Bodun. The Western Tiirk Qaganate and the Ashina Clan," Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi 
15 (2006), 164, n.24. 
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There is thus a dichotomy at the heart of the West-East division. On the one hand, the 
political and administrative forces tended to pull the two apart over the era, but on the other, the 
cultural and religious lifeblood of the charismatic structure held the disparate parts together. As 
much of a cop-out as it sounds, the best response to these problems is to consider the Western 
and Eastern Khaganates as differently separated at different times. While the hard split of603 (or 
even earlier) still has a place in marking general trends, the degree of partition was motivated by 
individual khagans and in response to specific circumstances at the time. This is the only model 
that can account for a Western Khan, Tong Yabghu, who continues the use ofyabghu, acts 
entirely separately from the East, and attempts to gain the title of supreme khagan for himself. As 
such, the degree of separation between east and west will here be treated on an individual level 
with an appreciation for change over time, insofar as the evidence allows. 
Where, then, does that leave diplomacy9 As Barfield sagely notes, "Inner Asian Nomadic 
States were organized as 'imperial confederacies,' autocratic and statelike in foreign affairs, but 
consultative and federally structured intcrnally."98 That general statement bears out in the case of 
the Turkic KJ1aganate. Their interactions with the Romans, Persians, and Chinese alike all evince 
a unified and sophisticated diplomatic presentation, regardless of internal political events. 
Perhaps it is most telling that the Romans report none of the preceding power struggles, even as 
the Romans unknowingly traipse right into the middle of them. It is doubtful too that the 
Sasanians had much of a sense that the Turks were "partitioning'' as they sent an army deep into 
the Iranian plateau. 
()8 Barfield, Perilous Frontier, 8. 
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Michael R. Drompp notes that, unlike in many states, foreign diplomacy was a significant 
tool of state-making and internal cohesion in Inner Asian empircs. 99 This general principle shows 
nowhere better than in the Turks. After all, the initial rise to power was predicated more on the 
Turkic ability to negotiate an alliance with a settled Chinese state than pure might alone. So too, 
the conquest of the Hcphthalites was enabled through an alliance of convenience with the 
Sasanians. For all that the Roman and Chinese sources tend to portray the Turks as simple 
barbarians, the careful use of diplomacy was as integral to their survival as their ability to 
conquer a city. It is thus unsurprising that the Turks approached Constantinople first, and not 
vice versa. The opportunity for an alliance was there, and the Turks had all the tools to forge it. 
Unbeknownst to the Romans, these were not yet another tribe of long-haired, bow-legged 
barbarians, but a genuine empire which served as the culmination of centuries of developments 
in Inner Asia. But unbeknownst to the Turks, they had found an ally who would not be won 
easily. 
'J'l Michael R. Drompp "Strategies of Cohesion and Control in the Tilrk and Uyghur Empires," in Complexity of 
Interaction Along the Eurasian Steppe Zone in the First A1il!ennium CE, ed. Jan Bemmann and Michael Schmauder 
(Bonn: Vor- und Friihgeschichtliche Archaologie Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat, 20 I 5), 439-41 
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Section Three: Turco-Roman Diplomacy in the Time of Justin II 
The first alliance with the Turks, commencing under Justin II, is no doubt our best 
documented, owing especially to the excellent treatment given by Menander Protector. It is thus 
unsurprising that it is also among the most studied. However, a careful reading of the account of 
Menander, in conjunction with the many other written sources which touch on it, reveals many 
facets that have yet gone unappreciated. Although Menander tries very hard to convince his 
audience of the importance of the alliance and the Romans' commitment to it, the facts he 
presents simply do not line up with that interpretation. Far from being a strategic masterstroke, 
using the Turkic Empire to force the Sasanians into a two-front war, Justin H's alliance with the 
Turks was in fact simply one of many diplomatic maneuvers aimed at escalation, designed more 
to frighten than to destroy. The inconstancy and haughtiness exhibited by the Roman state here 
will cast a pall over all future negotiations with the Turks. 
The first diplomatic contact between the Turks and Romans seems to have occurred at the 
very end of Justinian's reign, in 563. Unfortunately, we know next to nothing about this 
encounter apart from a tantalizingly brief mention in Theophanes the Confessor: "In the same 
month [July of 563] envoys arrived from Aske!, king of the Hermichiones.'' 100 The 
Hermichionites have been identified as the "Kirmikhiones" described as an alternative name for 
the Turks by Theophanes of Byzantium. 101 Their "king," Aske!, has been subject to a number of 
readings and onomastic interpretations, none of which are clearly convincing. 102 In any case, the 
biggest missing piece of Theophancs' account is the purpose of these "envoys." It is not at all 
100 Theoph. Chronicle AM 6048. 
101 Theoph. Byz, 2. 
102 For example, Sinor, "Establishment,'' 302 identifies it as a tribal designation; Karoly Czegledy, ·'From East to 
West: The Age of Nomadic Migrations in Eurasia'' Archivum Eurusiae Medii Aevi 3 ( l983): 77 identifies it as 
another name for Ishtemi. 
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clear that this was intended as a diplomatic mission or an attempt at an alliance. Ce11ainly, there 
were no appreciable results of the embassy, and Menander Protector can describe the major 
embassy of 568 without mention of earlier contacts. 
However, the ambiguity does not entirely preclude some speculative conclusions from 
being drawn. For one thing, it is highly significant that the Turks sent the embassy first, 
apparently unprompted, as they had done with the Sasanians. Such a proactivity suggests the 
importance of diplomacy to the Turks in general and the interest in Rome in particular. As has 
already been observed, the elimination of the Hephthalite threat had ruined the already rather ad 
hoc Turco-Sasanian accord, and a new stabilizing alliance was clearly needed. This earlier 
embassy may also account for the seeming ease of diplomacy relayed in Menander's account of 
the 568 embassy. Despite the generally fragmentary nature of Menander· s history, this seems to 
be a coherent, self-contained narrative, with little room for substantial lacunae. It is entirely 
possible that Menander is simply eliding many of the details, either deliberately or from 
ignorance, but his account depicts none of the expected hiccups of a novel relationship (visible, 
for example, in Justinian's A var troubles). An earlier, foundation-laying embassy would explain 
that strange familiarity. 
In any case, this earlier embassy could hardly have compared to the embassy of 568. The 
fullest account of the proceedings is given by Menander Protector, 103 although important 
supplements to it are provided by other historians, especially John of Ephesus, Theophanes the 
Confessor, and Theophanes Byzantinus. According to Menander, the Turks first sent an embassy 
to the Persians, seeking permissions to sell raw silk within their empire, but Khusro expelled the 
ambassadors and burned the silk. That first embassy was Sogdian by extraction, under the 
10
-' Men. Prat., Fr. 10. 
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leadership ofManiakh. 104 When Ishtemi (Sizaboulos) heard of the Sasanian rejection, he sent 
another embassy "since he wished to establish friendly relations between them and his own 
state." 105 This time Khusro had them murdered (presumably Maniakh was not among them). It 
was only after this indignity that the Turks turned to Rome. 
This is a fascinating prologue to the Roman embassy, one unattested by other sources, 
and thereby representing our only real glimpse into the collapse Turco-Sasanian relations. For 
one thing, it places the blame on Khusro. In itself, that is somewhat suspicious, given hath the 
general tendencies of Roman histories when it comes to "Oriental despots'' and the fact that the 
story most likely came from the Turkic embassy to Constantinople. But, on the other hand, there 
is nothing to disprove it either. 
If indeed Khusro was the primary cause of the alliance's collapse. one wonders why. 
Menander reports that one Katulph, a Hephthalite who had betrayed his people to the Turks, 
convinced Khusro of the Turks' "untrustworthiness." 106 However, ascribing these political 
decisions to a single individual is a fundamental topos of classical history, and the tendency of 
scholars has rightly been to search for a deeper reason. Peter Golden speculates that there might 
have been a commercial motivation - namely that the Sasanians did not want to grant the Turks 
entry into their western silk market. 107 However, one wonders whether Khusro would have done 
so, since the Turks could and indeed did simply take their business to the Romans, who were in 
the market for new trade route. 108 Rather. it is more likely that the direct impetus for Khusro 's 
rejection had more to do with the simple strategic reality of the northeastern frontier- with the 
104 Despite Blockley's description of Maniakh as a turkic name (History, 262, n.113), Maniakh has been 
reconstructed convincingly as a Sogdian one, Golden, Introduction, 128. 
105 Men. Prat., Fr. I 0.1 
106 Men. Prat., Fr. IO.I. 
107 Golden, Introduction, 128. 
ioa For the Romans' rather recent attempts to connect with "Ethiopian" (Aksumite) trade, see Procop. wars, 1,20.1-9 
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Hephthalites gone, the Turks were obviously the primary rival for the wealthy states of the Oxus 
river valley. 109 De la Vaissiere notes that the rejection of the silk was "a lofty refusal to use the 
most symbolic fruit of [Turkic] expansion.'' 110 
Whatever the reason, the Turks' alliance with Sasanians was dead, and the Romans were 
the natural ally against their newfound enemy. To that end, lshtemi dispatched Maniakh on an 
embassy to Constantinople, carrying with him a gift of raw silk and a letter. Speaking to the 
diplomatic sophistication at the Turks' disposal, Maniakh evidently performed beautifully, doing 
"everything according to the laws offriendship." 1II Theophanes Byzantinus adds an interesting 
wrinkle in noting that the Romans presented silk back to Maniakh's embassy, the Romans 
having gotten their hands on some Chinese silkworrns. 112 As shocked as the Turks may have 
been, the domestic production could certainly not match the quality and quantity of silk from 
China. Although the presence of silk clearly implies a trade connection, the Turkic embassy also 
had a diplomatic agenda from the outset, "asked the Romans for peace and an offensive and 
defensive alliance" and "added that they were also very willing to crush those enemies of the 
Roman state who were pressing upon their tcrritory." 113 
Fortunately for the Turks, they had come at a perfect time. Justinian had died in 565, and 
was succeeded by his nephew Justin II, who was of a rather different temperament, one much 
more favorable for the Turks. As Michael Whitby has noted, "Justin is traditionally judged, and 
condemned ... because of his handling of the empire's external affairs." 114 As such, his efforts in 
rn9 Such an interpretation, while rightly still accounting for the commercial importance, is given by de la VaissiCrc, 
Sogdian 1i-aders, 228-32. 
110 De la Vaissiere, Sogdian Traders, 232. 
111 Men. Prot., Fr. 10.1. 
112 Theo. Byz. 3. 
111 Men. Prot., Fr. 10.1. 
114 Michael Whitby, "The Successors of Justinian," in The Cambridge Ancient Histo,y Volume XIV: late 
Antiquity.Empire and Successors, A.D. 425-600, 3'' ed., eds. Averil Cameron, Bryan Ward-Perkins, and Michael 
Whitby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 90. 
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the east have been thoroughly examined, although a full analysis cannot detain us here. 115 His 
policy can be summed up as a rather aggressive one, and, unlike his predecessor, one highly 
unwilling to spend money on things like tribute payments. Most onerous, in his mind, were the 
payments to the Persians, which were the most taxing on both the coffers and imperial dignity. 
As such, he was set against the treaty of 562, and moved almost immediately to subvert it with a 
new, aggressive posture in Sasanian relations - visible especially in the diplomatic conflict over 
Suania. 116 In this respect, Justin II and the Turks had a mutual enemy, and were thus natural 
allies. 
It is therefore unsurprising that Justin was highly receptive to the Turks' proposal. After 
practically interrogating the Turks for details about geo- and ethnographic detail, 117 Justin, on 
Menander's account, seemingly embraced the alliance then and there. Presumably to put the final 
touches on the alliance negotiation, Justin dispatched Zemarchus, his magister militum per 
Orientem, 118 to return with Maniakh to lshtemi's court. Clearly, Zemarchus' extraordinary 
journey into the heart of Eurasia excited the imagination of Menander and his audience, and the 
excursus on his mission is rich in ethnographic detail. However, the geography is highly 
problematic. Establishing an exact itinerary and the precise location of the Turkic court he 
visited is exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible. 119 This problem is of minimal importance to 
115 More thorough analyses of his foreign affairs can be found in Whitby, "Successors of Justinian," 90-94; and, with 
a particular focus on the Persians, Harry Turtledove, ""Justin II's Observance of Justinian's Persian Treaty of 562,'' 
Byzantinische Zeitschrifl 76 (1983): 292-301. 
116 Turtledove, "Justin II's Observance," 292-297. 
117 A. D. Lee, Information and Frontiers: Roman Foreign Relations in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Umversity Press, 1993). 168, rightly notes this as an important example of information-gathering by the state. 
111 Blockley, History, 263. n. 125. 
119 For a good summary of older scholarship, see Blackley, Histmy, 264, n.129; more recent attempts at a 
reconstruction include Mihaly Dobrovits. "The Altaic World Through Byzantine Eyes: Some Remarks on the 
Historical Circumstances of Zemarchus' Journey to the Turks (AD 569-570)." Acta Orientalia Academiae 
Sc,entarum flungaricae 64 (20 I I): 373-409; and Golden, Intrnduction, 129-130. 
Melvin 40 
the present examination; it suffices to say that he journeyed very far inland (despite Menander's 
underselling of''many days'' 120) to a Turkic power center called Ektag. 
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Map I: Central and Western Asia at the time a/Justin fl Many of these locations arc vague and highfv .~pcc:11/ati1 1c (thus the dual EAtog.1). 
m~ing hoth to nomadism and imprecise descriptwns in Afenandcr. 
Many themes found in Zemarchus' mission will recur throughout Turco-Roman 
diplomacy. Zemarchus participated in a shamanic (here loosely defined) purification ritual before 
being admitted into the Turkic heartland. Most likely, participating in the ritual was a sign of 
good faith for the Turks, and imbued the proceedings with the same sacral aura that the oaths did 
to the Romans. When Zemarchus met with Ishtemi in his extravagant, golden furniture-filled 
tent, the two exchanged diplomatic pleasantries and got down to business - namely, feasting and 
drinking. This demonstrates an important point about Turco-Roman diplomacy. In many cases, 
the personal relationship between ambassador and host seems far more important than the heady 
political negotiations we might expect. Indeed, Menander, otherwise detailed in such areas, 
relates nothing of the sort. Rather, he emphasizes the building of a friendship between 
Zemarchus and Ishtemi parallel to that of the Roman and Turkic states. It is possible that, again, 
the to poi of our sources are distorting the picture somewhat. But, more deeply, the sources reveal 
the underlying thought that empowered that personal relationship. In a society which reduces 
120 Men. Prot., Fr. 10.3. 
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complex political phenomena to individuals, of course the main instrument of diplomacy would 
be through individuals. 
Presumably, however, there were also some negotiations sprinkled in between the 
revelries, and an agreement was struck with apparent ease. As a means of completing the 
alliance, Zemarchus and his closest associates (including a newly gifted female slave) joined 
lshtemi on a campaign against the Sasanians. But on the way, they were met by a Sasanian 
embassy while encamped at Talas. 121 Given the fact that Khusro had so violently refused Turkic 
diplomacy, one wonders why he would send an embassy now; Golden is probably correct in 
seeing the motive more as sabotage of a Roman alliance than a genuine attempt to reopen 
diplomacy. 122 John of Ephesus gives further insight into their argument, wherein they claimed 
that the Romans were merely their slaves, as evinced by the tribute payments stipulated in 
562. 123 This argument was unsuccessful. All the embassy earned was a place of dishonor and an 
eventual banishment. With them left the last hurdle to a Turco-Roman alliance, or so it seemed. 
After the alliance was concluded, Zemarchus began his return journey home. Narrowly 
avoiding a Persian ambush in the Caucasus, he returned home to Constantinople in 571. 124 All in 
all, then. Zemarchus' embassy was exceedingly successful, and had begun the relationship in the 
best way possible. Through careful analysis, it also reveals a great deal about the goals and 
nature of Turco-Roman cooperation. Most importantly, the alliance was directed against the 
Sasanians, not the A vars. For all that the Turks notify the Romans that the A vars were their 
rightful slaves and that they will one day reclaim them, 125 the alliance was never meant for that 
121 This is the same Talas that saw the 751 battle between Islamic and Chinese armies, per Blockley, 265 n. 137. 
122 Golden, Introduction, 129. 
12.
1 John Eph. HE. 6.12-13. 
124 John Eph. !IE. 6.23; Menander adds that he sen! a messenger named George a few days ahead on a faster route, 
fr. 10.4. but he could not have been too far ahead of Zemarchus. 
12 -' Men. Prot., Fr. 10.1. 
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purpose by either side. In fact, Menander does not mention them during the Zemarchus embassy, 
and the other historians do not mention them at all in this context. Its absence bears a great deal 
of emphasis here since the A var problem will become a central one later. 
Menander further emphasizes that targeting the Sasanians was Justin's main goal, as 
"with the Turks attacking from one direction and the Romans from another, the Persians would 
easily be destroyed." 126 In fact, he outright states that the alliance with the Turks "most 
encouraged Justin to open hostilities to the Pcrsians.'' 127 Despite that, the casus be/Ii for the war 
came not from the Turks but from Annenia. 128 It may indeed be the case that, as Turtledove 
suggests, the Turkic alliance "encouraged Justin II to be more favorably inclined toward war." 129 
However, it bears mention that the alliance had not yet been totally formalized when Justin 
began to foment rebellion in Annenia - Zemarchus was still on the steppe. 130 At that point, all 
the Romans had was a general declaration of peace and friendship. Certainly, it would not be out 
of character for Justin to act impetuously, having simply assumed that the Turkic alliance would 
succeed. But it could also well be that the Turkic alliance was not as strong a motivator for Justin 
as Menander suggests. 
Indeed, when the war with the Sasanians broke out in 572, the Turkic alliance 
mysteriously disappears from Menander's pages. as it does with our other sources for the period. 
There are no great battles on the Sasanians· northeastern border, and Khusro's attention seems to 
have been focused entirely on the western front. It is also possible that our sources were simply 
ignorant of the affairs in the far east, but that alone (especially for the well-connected Menander) 
1
"' Men. Pro!., Fr. 13.5. 
127 Men. Prot., Fr. 13.5. 
128 An in-depth analysis of this flashpoint is to be found in Lee E. Patterson, "Justin II and the Armenian Revolt of 
572." HiMA. Revue internationale d'Histoire Militaire Ancienne 10 (2021). (forthcoming). 
129 Turtledove, "Justin ll's Observance," 298 
uo Patterson, ''Justin II," (forthcoming) convincingly argues for 570 as the date of the Armenian plea, which brought 
Justin into planning the revolt. 
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would indicate the lack of a coordinated alliance. That is not to imply that there was no action 
between Sasanians and Turks. Given the hostilities established in Zemarchus' visit, it would only 
be natural to assume that there were Turkic incursions. But the Roman war effort failed, and 
Justin had a mental breakdown; all the while, the Turks were nowhere to be found. 
That lack of mention raises a fundamental question about the 568 alliance - what exactly 
did it do? From the outset, it seems as though there was very little change afier Zemarchus' visit. 
The Turks seem to already have been hostile with the Persians at least by the events at Talas, and 
there was clearly no coordinated action with the Romans atter the outbreak of their Persian War 
in 572 - otherwise our sources would surely mention it. For their part, the Romans had been 
inching towards war with the Sasanians since Justin's accession, even without the confidence 
booster of the Turkic alliance. It may well be that, as Turtledove states, ''the Byzantine-Turkish 
connection was at this time more trouble than it was worth." 131 
There is, however, reason to suggest that the Turkic alliance was little ·'trouble'· at all. 
Certainly, for Menander, it was a central event, but this may well owe more to his sources than to 
its importance. For the other major historians of the period, the Turkic alliance is not as 
prominent a factor, seeing only a brief mention, often alongside other diplomatic embassies. 132 
Zcmarchus· journey to the Turkic court was indeed remarkable (although, given the Romans' 
general lack of geographic information of the steppes, 133 it is doubtful he knew it would be so 
distant until the middle of the journey), but the general principle was not. As magister militum 
per Orientem, negotiating and alliance with barbarians was well within his purview, as 
131 Turtledove, "Immediate Successors," 166. 
132 Contrast, for example, Menander's account with the brief account of John Eph. 6.22 or the even briefer one in 
Theoph. Con. AM 6063. 
133 Lee, Information, 89-90. 
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demonstrated, for example, in his successor Justinian's negotiation with the Ghassanids. 134 As 
noted by Dobrovits, the language of"peace and alliance" is rare for barbarians, 135 but Menander 
presents this as a request from the Turks, not something the Roman offered. 
But if the alliance with the Turks was not the silver bullet Menander portrays, what was 
Justin's purpose in pursuing it? Rather than an altogether unique experiment, it is wiser to view 
the Turkic alliance as a part of a pattern of diplomatic troublemaking that was the key to Justin's 
foreign policy. From Suania to Annenia to Arabia, Justin was constantly interfe1ing with local 
politics and escalating the hitherto donnant conflicts between Roman and Sasanian interests. In 
so doing, he was working against his despised treaty of 562 and its resultant payments. Forming 
an alliance with the Turks fit into that mold quite nicely. Simply by accepting a Sogdian trade 
delegation in Constantinople, he had violated the provision of the treaty forcing barbarian 
merchants to go through approved entrep6ts at Dara and Nisibis. 136 Further, Justin must have 
known that the alliance would have sent signals to Khusro that a war was imminent. For this 
purpose, the fact that the alliance was more real in perception than in ··sober fact'' does not 
particularly matter. 137 All of this fits in exceedingly well with Justin's general policy of 
escalation on the eastern frontier, likely pushing for a renegotiated treaty without the payments. 
If this was his goal, then it worked quite well. As indicated by his numerous attempts to 
stop the alliance with both diplomacy and murder, Khusro clearly saw a great deal of danger in 
the possibility. As Patterson notes, the fear of nomads could well have loomed large in his mind, 
given the defeat of Peroz by the Hephthalites in 484. 138 In fact, Theophanes Byzantinus directly 
1·
14 John Eph. HE 6.4. 
115 Dobrovits. "Altaic World." 383. 
L\() Men. Prot.. Fr. 6.1. 
D7 Turtledove, ··Immediate Successors,'' 166. 
1.1s Patterson, "Justin II," (forthcoming) n. 12. 
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links Khusro's fears to his expeditions into the Arabian Peninsula. 139 Justin had successfully 
applied pressure and had earned an Armenian war for his trouble. However, the Turks had served 
their role, and the alliance had no particular reason to continue. Justin was more than capable of 
simply dropping alliances no longer of immediate use. A similar act of inconstancy would later 
lead to a deterioration of relations with his Ghassanid allies, with quite disastrous results. 140 
Regardless of their strength as an empire, the Turks were a part of this game more than a genuine 
strategic consideration. In that sense, then, there was little difference between them and the other 
peripheral barbarians, like the A vars or Arabs. 
Despite Menander's assurances of Justin's commitment, the events rather seem to 
indicate a failure on the part of the Romans to follow up on the commitments Zemarchus made. 
Menander mentions a continuation of embassies from either side, but recounts none in detail, and 
none seem to have resulted in any major developments of the alliance. The Romans were, of 
course, rather occupied by the Sasanian war, but it is easy to see from the Turkic viewpoint how 
uninvested the Romans seemed in an alliance. This is especially magnified ifwe compare the 
Roman alliance with the other great alliances in living memory of the Turks, with the Wei and 
Sasanians. In both cases, the alliance had been quite rapidly sealed with a diplomatic marriage 
and coordinated military action had occurred shortly thereafter. Neither of these things happened 
with the Romans. The Turks had good reason to feel that the Romans were simply leading them 
on, and as suggested above, they may well have been. It is thus hardly shocking that the relations 
between the two empires began to disintegrate rapidly. 
119 Theoph. Byz. 3. 
140 John Epiph. HE 6.3-4; Michael Whitby, The Emperor Maurice and His Historian: Theophylact Simocatta on 
Persian and Balkan Warfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 257. 
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Section Four: The Collapse of the Turco-Roman Accord 
Ultimately, it was Justin II's successors who reaped what he had had sown, and the 
alliance would collapse at the beginning of Tiberius's reign, It did so in suitably dramatic 
fashion, with the virulent accusations of Tourxanthos recorded in Menander. Thus came the 
nadir of Turco-Roman relations, the Turks' invasion of the Roman Crimea. Traditionally 
(including in the Roman sources), conflict over the A vars has been considered the primary 
reason for this collapse. 141 However, this view requires some modification; the contributing 
factors to the collapse are manifold and not always easily perceptible in Menander's account 
alone. The question of why this collapse stuck is almost as interesting as the reason for the 
collapse in the first place, although the sheer paucity of sources (both in general and in reference 
to the Turks) render a definitive answer impossible. In any case, the collapse ranks, alongside 
Zemarchus' embassy and the invasion of Transcaucasia, as a moment of signal import, setting 
the tone for Turco-Roman relations thenceforth. 
From the Roman perspective, the collapse of relations with the Turks was incredibly 
sudden. In the latter years of Justin's sanity, relations had continued in some capacity. Menander 
attests to the presence of I 06 Turks in Constantinople, who had been sent, as Menander 
unhelpfully relates, on "various occasions." 142 Menander gives a list of proper names of the 
ambassadors they had accompanied without any specification of times or embassies. Blockley 
suggests that this is probably a summary of another, fuller account of post-Zemarchus Turco-
Roman diplomacy, either in a lost fragment of Menander or in his source. 143 In any case, a basic 
headcount (in addition to Menander's note that one ambassador went twice) would give a rough 
141 See, e.g., Sinor, "Establishment," 304; Pohl, A vars, 79-80. 
142 Men. Prat. Fr. 19.1. 
14·1 Blockley. Histor;-, 275, n. 218. 
Melvin 47 
estimate of at least six embassies. The Orkhon Inscriptions, some 250 years later, record that the 
people came from the nation of"Apurum'' to the funeral of!shtemi in 576; 144 an identification of 
"Apurum" with "Rome" is tempting, although ultimately unprovable. 145 Furthem1ore, these later 
inscriptions may well exaggerate or refer to the mission ofValentinus (in which Ishtemi is 
indeed mourned). It is, however, doubtful that any of these embassies were on the scale of 
Zemarchus' or the upcoming mission of Valcntinus. 
In 576, two years after Tiberius II's crowning as Caesar, he sent another envoy to the 
Turks, this one headed by one Valentinus, an imperial bodyguard. 146 This can be seen as part of 
the general foreign policy aims of Tiberius and his co-regent, the Empress Sophia, which 
emphasized rapprochement with Roman allies, even those who had abandoned Justin. 147 So too 
was this matched by negotiations with the Sasanians. It would, however, be too simplistic to 
wholly contrast Tiberius· and Justin's agendas. Even as Tiberius and Sophia pursued a truce with 
the Persians, they continued to build a force against them, expanding the army and building a 
coalition of barbarian allies. 148 Reaffirming and redoubling the alliance with the Turks fit well 
within that plan. 
Valentinus was well-qualified for the position. He was that selfsame two-time 
ambassador to the Turks, and apparently had a substantial entourage at his disposal. In addition, 
he traveled to the Khaganate alongside all 106 Turks who were in Constantinople. 149 This does 
read as slightly odd, and Blockley's reading of the Turks' abandonment of the city as a grim 
144 E. Denison Ross, "The Orkhon Inscriptions: Being a Translation of Professor Vilhelm Thomsen 's Final Danish 
Rendering,'' Bulletin of'the School of Oriental Studies, University ol London 5 ( 1930): 864; The inscription refers Jo 
both Ishtem1 and Bumin, but if the Apurum are indeed the Romans, ii could only be the funeral of lshtemi. 
145 See, e.g., Pohl, Avars, 80 for the identification. 
146 Men. Prot. Fr. 19.1. 
147 C.f. the Turkic mission with those to the Caucasian allies in Men. Prot. Fr. 18.5. 
148 Tiberius' expansion of the army is attested in John Eph., HE, 1.5.: the presence of barbarians is attested by 
Evagnus. HE, 5.14. 
149 Men. Prot. Fr. 19. l. 
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portent of the coming collapse is understandable, if not provable. 150 At the very least, the fact 
that every one of the Turks came along is suggestive of the importance of this mission. Sailing 
across the Black Sea, Valentinus traveled from Bosporus into Turkic territory, although 
corruption of the Greek and geographical confusion render a precise itinerary impossible to 
establish. 151 On his way to the court of the Western Yabghu Khagan, he first met with 
Tourxanthos. 
The identity of this Tourxanthos has been debated within the historiography. He is 
certainly separate from Tardush, the ultimate heir of Ishtemi, as Menander mentions a 
"Tardou."' 152 Unlike the earlier embassy, Valentinus did not meet with the ruler of the Western 
Turks. The name Tourxanthos has been identified as a rendering of the title Turk-shad - which is 
elsewhere attested in the Turkic system. 153 However, this means that we do not have a personal 
name (like Bumin or lshtemi) by which to identify him. According to Menander, Tourxanthos 
was one of the sub-rulers of the Turkic Khaganate, which had been divided into eight parts after 
the death of lshtemi and come under the supreme rule of one "Arsilas." 154 He was also the son of 
lshtemi and thereby brother ofTardush. Valentinus met with Tourxanthos because he was the 
first stop on his journey to the court of the Y abghu Khagan, suggesting that his power base was 
in the far west. 
That set of attributes does not line up with any figures mentioned in the Chinese sources. 
the most reliable charts of Turkic history. Denis Sinor points out that our Chinese sources never 
150 Blackley, Histo,y, 275, n.218. 
151 For a very thorough discussion of this section, see Blockley, Histo1y, 275-276. n. 219. 
152 Men. Prat. Fr. 19.1. 
15 -'Gyula Moravscik, Byzantinoturcica, Volume 2 Sprachreste der TilrA-vij/ker in den Byzantinischen Que/len 
(Leiden: Bnll, I 983), 328. 
154 Men. Prot. Fr. 19.1; the identification of Arsilas is another matter entirely, although given the fact that he is never 
mentioned again in any source and seems to have been replaced by Tardush, it matters little for the present 
discussion. For and overview, see Blackley, History, 276, n. 222. 
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mention any sons of Ishtemi other than Tardush. 155 However, absence of evidence is not 
evidence of absence, and it seems perfectly plausible that a western-based son of Ishtemi (there 
were likely a great many) could well have escaped the Chinese radar. Furthermore, the 
succession of Ishtcmi is rather underreported. Stereotypically, the succession systems of steppe 
empires are ill-defined and instigate internecine violence. That formulation would appear in the 
Turkic state, notably in the contentious succession to Taspar after his death in 581. 156 However, 
we lack evidence for any such conflict after Ishtemi • s death. It rather appears that the transition 
to Tardush's reign was a peaceful one. with the Western steppes remaining united. And before 
the succession crisis of 581, Tardush was firmly ensconced as junior to the Eastern Khagan. 
Tourxanthos thus cannot be taken as a rogue element. It is much more likely that he was 
executing the foreign policy of his superiors. 
Upon his presentation to Tourxanthos, Valentinus naturally indulges in the diplomatic 
pleasantries of rejoicing the emperor and expressed his desire to '·reconfirm just as strongly" the 
alliance with Ishtemi. " 7 In reply, Tourxanthos immediately began ranting about Roman 
duplicity: "Are you not those very Romans who use ten tongues and lie with all ofthem?"158 
Valentinus and the envoys were treated to a litany of more specific accusations and outright 
threats against their lives. No doubt, the aim had now been shifted from negotiating an alliance to 
getting out alive. On Menander's account. the envoys were only spared due to Tourxanthos' 
sorrow at Ishtemi' s death. The Romans were compelled to slash their cheeks as a symbol of 
155 Sinor, ·'Establishment," 305; Sinor also alleges that Tourxanthos and Tardush were not brothers (Menander uses 
the ambiguous "ii/la,µoc;"). This is part of Sinor's misguided conviction that Sizibou\os (explicitly identified as 
Tourxanthos' father) and lshtemi are not to be equated owing to ''unbridgeable phonetic distances'' which arc 
bridged in Golden, Introduction, 127-128. 
156 The best summary is to be found in Barfield, Perilous Frontier, 134-38. 
"
7 Men. Prot. Fr. 19.1. 
158 Men. !'rot. Fr. 19.1. 
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mourning, 159 but otherwise escaped unscathed, being sent on to meet with Tardush. However, on 
the way, the Turks attacked the Roman city of Bosporus, signaling that the rage ofTourxanthos 
was not mere bluster. Valentinus and his embassy returned home, having lost the alliance rather 
than renegotiated it. 
Menander's information was good. A.O. Lee reasonably postulates that records of 
embassies were indeed kept at the imperial capital, and Menander had access to them, as 
demonstrated by his account of Zemarchus. 160 However, his portrayal ofTourxanthos is riddled 
with topoi that render the characterization quite troublesome; whether originating in those 
sources or Menander's editorializing, Tourxanthos' perfect adherence to Roman stereotypes 
raises questions. Above all, he is defined by his a).a(owicx - his undue arrogance and 
boastfulness. This is among the most common and widely reviled barbarian characteristics in the 
Greco-Roman tradition. It is, for example, commonly used by Plutarch in describing 
barbarians, 161 and Polybius sees it as a principal failing of Hannibai. 162 More contemporary to 
Menander, Procopius and Agathias both attribute (xic1x(ow:ia to the Persians. 163 Menander's 
Tourxanthos is also nakedly duplicitous, secretly beginning the invasion of Bosporus even as he 
claims that "to lie is alien to the Turk." 164 Menander has crafted here the perfect representation of 
a bad barbarian, and for that reason, it is important not to simply take his vision at face value. 
The precise historicity of Menander's given speech notwithstanding, his treatment of 
Tourxanthos' complaints is specific enough to suggest that they are broadly accurate. Menander 
most heavily focuses on the Avar problem. Tourxanthos apparently considered the Roman 
159 Such a practice is also attested among the Huns by Priscus, Fr. 24.1. 
160 Lee, Information, 33-40. 
161 For an examination of Plutarch· s usage, see Anastasios G. Nikolaidis, '''EA/,T]V!K6; - 0ap0aptK6-;: Plutarch on 
Greek and Barbarian Characteristics," Wiener Srudien 99 ( 1986): 229-44. 
1
''' Polyb. I 0.33.6. 
l/JJ Procop. Wars. 1.14.; Agath. 4.8. 
164 Men. Prat. fr. 19.1. 
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negotiation and settlement with the A vars to be in a violation of the Turks' sovereignty over 
them - they arc their slaves (6ov}.01). 165 For Menander, Tourxanthos' Avar claim is the supreme 
example of his b),o.(ovcio.. Tourxanthos (and by extension, the Turkic state) is claiming 
sovereignty over a group of people clearly shown to be independent of them. Clearly, this 
confonns to the topos of the arrogant barbarian. However, given the universalist claims of Turkic 
rule, 166 it could well be a misunderstanding of the Turks' actual ideology. More problematic is 
the accusation that the Romans had violated that sovereignty in making a treaty with the A vars. 
Crucially, Tourxanthos does not claim that the Romans have taken the Avars as their subjects. 
Rather, what he seems to be implying is that the peace treaty between A vars and Romans would 
prevent the Turks from ''trampl[ingl [the A vars] under the hooves of our horses.'' 167 
One wonders what the logic is here. Menander certainly does not explain it. Presumably, 
the treaty to which Tourxanthos refers is that of 571, 168 which was apparently a straightforward 
peace treaty and hostage-taking, although this is a particularly fragmentary section of Menander. 
Certainly, this would not preclude the Romans from allowing the Turks to conquer them. It 
seems that Tourxanthos (and by extension, Tardush) would want the Romans to be allies in that 
conquest. But as demonstrated above, the A vars were not a point of discussion before this point. 
When Maniakh traveled to Constantinople, he did indeed mention that the Turks considered the 
Avars their rightful subjects, but only as a response to a direct question; the A vars vanish from 
negotiations thereafter. The alliance was anti-Sasanian, not anti-Avar. Unfortunately, the 
fragmentary nature of Menander's history means that the possibility of an account of formal 
Turco-Roman discussions of the A var problem being lost cannot be excluded. However, it is 
165 Men. Prat. Fr. I 9.1. 
IM, Golden. "Turks and Iranians," 34-37. 
11' 7 Men. Prat. Fr. I 9.1. 
168 Following Blockley's dating. Histo1T, 270 n. 176. 
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notable that Zemarchus' negotiations occur in a rather clear sequence in one substantial fragment 
with a beginning, middle, and end. If Menander did record such discussions, it would have made 
sense for them to occur here. 
Why, then, should the Turks expect assistance against the A vars? It seems to be an 
unreasonable expectation. Perhaps that was the point. This complaint against the Romans was 
unfair, and the Romans could not reasonably respond to it except by vague groveling, as 
Valentinus does. Furthennore, the treaty was already signed- there was nothing the Romans 
could do to change it now. Unlike the other claims, the A var complaint is grounded in a single 
specific incident - the negotiation of a treaty - which makes the alliance null and void. It thus 
provided an expedient escape from the alliance for the Turks, regardless of whether it was 
actually the biggest issue at play. 
What other reason would the Turks have? Menander does provide a secondary complaint, 
one much more intriguing than the A vars. Tourxanthos alleges that the Romans "take my envoys 
through the Caucasus to Byzantium, alleging that there is no other route,'' in order to deter him 
"'from attacking the Roman Empire by the difiicult terrain." 169 It bears mention that this is 
apparently true - we have no records of embassies leaving or entering the empire across the 
Danube. Of course, said route would be rather circuitous and take longer, and the connection to 
the Eurasian steppes had always been through the Cimmerian Bosporus and, over land, the 
Caucasus_i7° But Tourxanthos' point is more about the Romans hiding the route's existence than 
its practicality. We do not have any evidence for this, but before exonerating the Romans 
entirely, it must be acknowledged that such manipulations were well within their wheelhouse. As 
169 Men. Prot. Fr. 19.1. 
170 Precedent for this is clear from the third century, see R.C. Blockely, East Roman Foreign Policy: Formation and 
Conduct_fi'om Diocletian to Anastasi us (Leeds: Francis Cairns, 1992), 76. 
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discussed above, this tack was pulled against the A vars to keep them out of Scythia Minor (i.e., 
the same place the Turks were complaining about the Romans hiding). Control of movement was 
key to the Romans' strategy against nomads, and it would not be shocking if it were deployed 
here. 
More important than its specific use here, however, is the Romans' general deployment 
of the strategy. The issues of the A vars and Caucasian deception are just examples of the broader 
problem - Roman duplicity. Tourxanthos opens with his accusation that the Romans "use ten 
tongues and lie with all of them.'' 171 That accusation pertains not only to the Turks, but to '·all the 
tribcs." 172 It is clear that, even without the specific incidents, the Turks had observed Roman 
alliances with other peoples, including the A vars and Caucasians, and were none too pleased. 
Correctly identifying the Roman policy, Tourxanthos accuses the Romans of"having flattered 
and deluded all the tribes with your various speeches and your treacherous designs, when harm 
descends upon their heads you abandon them and take all the benefits for yourselves." 173 Our 
knowledge of diplomatic activity in the reign of Justin II is spotty- Menander is fragmentary 
and Theophylact's value depends on his sources. 174 Thus, we can point to few specifics in the 
Turks' vicinity. Nevertheless. we can observe the deployment of such duplicity in Justin's 
dealings with the Saracens. 175 lt is unlikely that the Turks knew the specifics of this relationship, 
but they could recognize the pattern made visible elsewhere. 
Clearly, the taking of Bosporus was the greatest manifestation of Turkic displeasure. 
However, the immediacy of the action - taken, as Menander relates, while Valentinus was 
171 Men. Prot. Fr. 19.1. 
172 Men. Prot. Fr. 19 .1 
173 Men. Prot. Fr. 19.1 
174 See Whitby, Emperor Maurice, 222-42 
175 John. Eph., HE, 6.3-4. 
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travelling to Tardush's court, may indicate that it was not merely a reaction to the breakdown of 
relations with Tourxanthos. The armies were evidently already in place well before Tourxanthos 
gave the order and Tourxanthos himself being in a "war camp." 176 It sounds rather more like the 
invasion was planned from the beginning, and the meeting with Valentinus merely an 
announcement of the intention rather than a spur-of-the-moment decision. Certainly, control over 
the Crimea was advantageous for the Turks - it was, after all, the nexus with the Romans, as 
demonstrated by Valentinus' journey beginning there. Furthermore, the invasion appears to have 
been very successful, with the Turks ultimately controlling Cherson (and thus the entire 
peninsula). 177 An interest in Western expansion was, after all, demonstrated by Tourxanthos. 
Perhaps the acquisition of this territory was enough to lose the alliance, especially in congress 
with the knowledge that the Romans make poor friends. 
The appeal of western expansion may well have been increased by the political realities 
on the Turk's Persian frontier. Even the sparse records of the previous period fall off in the 
period between the arrival of the Turks and the wars ofBahram Chobin, and thus anything said 
about the Sasanian East at this time is provisional. We can show that the extant coinage indicates 
strong Sasanian control south of the Oxus in the latter sixth century. 178 Furthermore, the major 
campaign of Khusro into Armenia contemporary with Valentinus' mission might well indicate a 
focus on the west that only a secure east could provide. 179 Certainly, there was no mustering of 
forces on the level seen during Bahram Chobin's war. 180 If indeed Turkic expansion had been 
176 I here follow Blockley·s reading that Menander is emphasizing the Turkic preparedness for war, History, 276, n. 
221. 
177 Men. Prat. 25.2. 
178 Rezakhani, ReOrienting, 176-77. 
179 For an overview of this campaign, with relevant primary source excerpts, see Greatrex and Lieu, Roman Eastern 
Frontier Part ll, 153-60. 
18°For the best summary, source analysis and bibliography, see Parvaneh Pourshariati. Decline and Fall (~(the 
Sasanian Empire (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 397-414. 
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halted on the Oxus and some settlement reached with the Turks, the alliance with the Romans 
would have outlived its usefulness, and the west would be the natural target for expansion. 
For any of these explanations, it is of the utmost importance not to fall back on 
monocausality. Particularly for premodem diplomacy, as personality driven as it was, any 
number of these factors, or other, unknown ones could have offended Tourxanthos and the 
Turkic rulership. Every one of these factors could well have damaged the relationship beyond 
repair, and with all of them in play, the deck was stacked against the Romans, even if they had 
no knowledge of that fact when they sent Valentinus. However, not to overdraw the breakdown 
of the Turco-Roman alliance into a complete and total breakdown. Certainly, this was not a 
shining diplomatic moment. However, the Turkic push into the Crimea did not result in an 
empire-scale war between them. Trade continued. But the alliance, if ever it was truly alive, was 
now well and truly dead. Furthermore, the close contact of .Justin's reign seems largely to have 
ceased. 
In the years between 576 and Heraclius, Roman sources cease referencing negotiations or 
embassies with the Turks. Theophylact Simocatta records a letter sent by an unnamed Khagan to 
Maurice. Principally, this letter serves as an excuse for a substantial excursus on Inner Asia; it is 
here where Theophylact inserts his long, confused explanation of the so-called Pseudo-A vars. 181 
Furthermore, he provides an equally confused account of an internal conflict in the Turkic state. 
As tempting as this account is, the tendency in the scholarship has rightly been to ignore it, given 
its lack of clarity and contradiction with Chinese sourccs. 182 In demonstration ofTheophylact's 
confusing nature, Michael and Mary Whitby attempt to securely identify these events as the 
succession crisis of 581. whereas Denis Sinor ascribes them to Tardush's conquest of the east c. 
181 Theoph. Sim. 7.7-8. 
182 Sinor, "Introduction,'' 306. 
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598. 183 Neither are wholly convincing. In any case. there is no diplomatic action suggested in this 
letter. Rather, if indeed it is historical, it served merely as a declaration of triumph. 
A similar principle applies to the mention of Turks by Theophanes the Confessor, which 
comes at the end of his coverage Maurice's war against Bahram Chobin (newly crowned Bahram 
VI). According to Theophanes, Khusro II sent the Turks serving in the army of Bahram to back 
to Constantinople, where they came before the emperor. 184 But before this is read as an 
indication of a persisting alliance, there are a number of factors that must be considered. For one 
thing, there is simply no way of knowing how precisely Theophanes is using "Turks" here, and, 
given the ancient sources· tendency to play fast and loose with the term, they very well could not 
have been the same Turks as the Western Khaganate. What is more, their presence within the 
army of Bahram suggests that they were mercenaries, rather than a separate arn1y of the Khagan; 
Theophanes does not give numbers for the Turks, so there is no way of knowing their strength. 
Most importantly of all, Theophanes does give us a reason for their being returned to Rome that 
has nothing to do with the Turkic Klrnganate: they were Christians. Apparently, they had 
converted after a plague had affected their homelands, tattooing crosses on their foreheads. 185 As 
tantalizing a clue as that is for the still poorly understood spread of Christianity in Inner Asia, it 
has little to do with diplomacy between the two nations. As such, this incident can be dismissed 
as contact between the Roman Empire and the Turkic Khaganate. 
But besides these fleeting mentions, the Turks may as well cease to exist in the Roman 
sources. Why was the collapse under Tiberius permanent9 Certainly, the geopolitical favor of the 
183 Michael and Mary Whitby, The Hist01y ofTheophylact Simocatta: An English Translation with Introduction and 
Notes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 196-97, n.43: Sinor 306-07. 
184 Theoph. Chron. AM 6081; Theophanes apparently lacks a conclusion to the story, merely noting it and moving 
on. 
185 Thcoph. Chron. AM 6081. 
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alliance had not vanished. The Romans continued to war with the Sasanians through 591, with 
war again breaking out in 602. For their part, the Turks were also in a major conflict with the 
Sasanians, one in which they were defeated by Bahram Chobin. 186 The conditions thus seem to 
have been as good in this period as they were in the 560s. And yet, there is no mention of an 
alliance even being considered by either party. 
It again bears emphasis that the Turks were the instigator of the alliance (and, indeed, the 
actor in its collapse). If the Turks did not send an embassy, the Romans were highly unlikely to 
instigate an alliance. And the Turks had good reasons not to send an embassy. At the root of all 
their reasons is the continuing reign of Tardush, which, with some interruptions, ran until the 
start of the sixth century. No doubt he, being the same khagan who presided over the collapse, 
would have been particularly ill-disposed to renegotiating one and admitting he was wrong. 
What is more, Tardush's reign marks the first major interregnum within the Turkic Empire, 
culminating in his attempt to seize control of the east and elevate himself to the position of senior 
khagan. 187 Throughout the period, there was scarcely the time to negotiate with the Romans, 
even ifhe had wanted to, and in his main target - the east - they were irrelevant. It would take a 
substantial reversal for the Romans and Turks to ally again. 
186 There is no evidence for the Romans having encouraged this attack, as Golden, Introduction, 1J2.J33, alleges. 
187 Sinor. introduction, 305-08. 
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Section Five: Detente, Alliance, and the Last Great War of Antiquity 
Given the collapse of Turco-Roman relations, it is remarkable that the recovery of the 
alliance was as quick as it was. However, careful examination reveals that this second alliance 
was a different beast entirely. Whereas the previous alliance had ultimately proven to be just 
another Roman manipulation of a northern "Barbarian" group, this was a true alliance of equals. 
Surely, Roman desperation lies at the heart of this sea change in Turkic policy, but their 
desperation proved fruitful. The alliance with the Turks played the decisive role in the final years 
of the Romans· great war with Persia, the so-called ·'Last Great War of Antiquity." But for all 
that they had been effective allies in war, the Turks proved to also be a vital part of the post-war 
settlement forged (principally) by Heraclius, the selfsame settlement which directly resulted in 
the success of the early Islamic conquests. 
The usurpation of Maurice by Phocas had renewed war between the Romans and 
Sasanians. For the purposes of the present 
examination, it suffices to say that this war 
went very poorly for the Romans, and by 620 
the Sasanians had captured the whole of the 
Roman Near East and pushed to the very walls 
of Constantinople. The Roman counterattack 




operations in Transcaucasia. 188 Heraclius won A1ap:: The .Vcor Easr, c. 6:!R 
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some victories over the Sasanians, although apparently at considerable cost. But arguably more 
188 The best synthesis of the many primary sources covering this period can be found in Howard~Johnston, 
"'Heraclius' ," 1-44. 
fsfatiar 
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important than any military action he took at this point, Heraclius focused on a diplomatic chann 
campaign with the local leaders and peoples on both sides of the Caucasus (our sources are not 
especially specific geographically), designed, as Theophanes reports, to encourage defections 
from the Sasanians. 189 
It is during this diplomatic campaign that negotiations with the Turks were reopened. 
Most of the extant sources pay little attention to these negotiations, mentioning only the alliance 
with the Turks as a/ail accompli. The great exception is Movses Dasxuranc'i, for whom the 
Turks arc a major villain in his History a/Albania. Given his importance as a source, Movses 
bears some assessment here. In reality, Movses was a compiler of previous material, much of 
which was likely compiled by the time he wrote his history, likely in the tenth century. 190 James 
Howard-Johnston has convincingly reconstructed a History of 682, likely written at or shortly 
after that time, which serves as the core of Book 11. 191 It is this source that provides the narrative 
of the Turks, drawn from "'a general overview of war and diplomacy, a vivid local Albanian 
history written by an eyewitness ... and a piece of [the Albanian Catholicos] Viroy's writing." 102 
As such, Movses' history is far more reliable as a source than its late date would imply. 
I lowcver, Movses' account is not without its flaws. It is highly selective~ indeed, the 
dramatic siege of Constantinople is not even mentioned. Since the author clearly had access to 
the history attributed to Sebeos, it might be surmised that this work was meant to be read in 
concert, and thus avoided redundancy. 103 Chronology is a major issue, with chapter 11 (which 
189 Theoph., Chron., AM 6115. 
190 James Howard-Johnston ·'Armenian Historians ofHeraclius: An Examination of the Aims, Sources, and 
Working-Methods ofSebeos and Movses Dashkurantsi,'' in The Reign o(Hemc/ius (610-641): Crisis and 
Confi-ontatian, eds. G.G Reinink and B.H. Stolte (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 49-56. 
191 Howard-Johnston, "Armenian Historians,'' 55-57. 
192 Howard-Johnston, "Armenian Historians," 57. 
193 James Howard-Johnston, Witnesses to a World in Crisis: Historians and Histories of the Middle East in the 
Seventh Centu,y (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 124. 
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describes the Turkic invasion of Albania) being incorrectly placed before their alliance with 
Heraclius. 194 As a direct transmission of the earlier History of 682, it maintains the older work's 
apocalyptic worldview, clearly laid out in that work's preface (wholly preserved in the middle of 
Movses'). 195 The Historv is indeed structured as an apocalypse, starting with a status quo of 
godly Roman rule and ending with the deleterious domination of the Turks and Arabs. As 
suggested by that description, the view of the Turks is almost comically negative. Thus, many of 
its descriptions ought to be taken with a t,>rain of salt. Furthermore, many of its most important 
statements cannot be independently verified from other sources, as can be done with 
Theophanes, for example. We must, then, tread carefully, and his narrative must occasionally be 
interrupted with critical commentary. 
The Turks first enter the story in 625/26. In that year, Heraclius, already in the Caucasus, 
decided to negotiate with the Turks, and sent one Andre to meet with them and ·'satisfy the thirst 
of these bestial, gold-loving tribes of hairy mcn." 196 Besides the negative animus that will mark 
the source's treatment of the Turks, this earliest mention reveals one crucial point: in contrast to 
the earlier diplomatic interaction, the Romans initiated contact. lndeed, these relations are 
marked by a role reversal ofManiakh's embassy in 568. This time, it is the Romans who came 
bearing gifts and lofty promises al the Sasanians' expense, and fortunately, the Turks proved 
equally receptive as had Justin II. Movses describes how a certain "Jehu Xak'an" agreed to the 
proposition with "great eagerness." 197 Clearly, this is an Armenian rendering of the title Y abghu 
Khagan, the name for the ruler of the Western Turks - identified as Tong Y abghu by the Chinese 
1()4 As much is obvious from the text itself, which references Heraclius as being their ally and describes events of 
Khusro's 38'h regnal year, i.e., 628, the year of his murder. 
195 Movses, History, 2.9. 
196 Movses, 1/istory, 2.12. 
197 Movses, J!istOf}', 2.12. 
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sources. 198 By clear parallels with Theophanes' account (namely at AM 6117), we can also 
establish him as the same ruler mentioned by Greek sources as "Ziebel.'' 
Troublesomely, Movses (and, indeed, most sources covering this period) does not 
identify these northern warriors as Turks; rather, they employ the term ·'Khazars.•· Some 
confusion is extant in the scholarship, and an explanation of their identification with the Turks 
warrants treatment here. The Khazars are the successors of the Turks on the Pantie-Caspian 
steppes, occupying much of their fonner role as trade intermediary and third great power in 
Western Eurasia. As such, many early references, often, as Golden notes, found in Sasanian 
traditions, are simple anachronisms owing to the sources' later origins. 199 Certainly, the presence 
of the Khazars looms large over our sources, evinced by the fact that the composition of the 
History o/682 was likely interrupted by a Khazar invasion in 685. 200 It is thus an understandable 
temptation for later writers to conflate them with earlier invasions. 
However, it is not necessary to discount the identification entirely. After all, Khazar 
origins are exceedingly mysterious as they ostensibly appear ex nihilo after the collapse of the 
Western Khaganate, with only al-Masudi explaining them as a transfonnation of the Sabirs. 201 It 
is thus far from an impossibility that the Khazars existed as a subtribe within the confederation of 
the Turks, and owing to simple geography, it would make sense for them to be the main force of 
the invading army. Such a reading may find support in the fact that Movses does not refer to 
Tong Yabghu as ''King of the Khazars," but as "the king in the north," to whom the Khazars arc 
subjects. As already demonstrated in Tourxanthos, the Turkic state was more than capable of 
198 Sinor, "Establishment," 308-10. 
199 Golden, Introduction, 235-36. 
200 Howard.Johnston, "Armenian Historians," 58. 
201 Golden, Introduction, 235•36 is a valuable examination of the issues at hand; the sanguine reading offered in the 
otherwise excellent Kevin Alan Brook, Jews of Khazaria, 2'' ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006 ), 11-
14, is not supported by the evidence. 
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coordinating foreign affairs with local rulers. Provisionally, we can thus say that these were 
Khazars, just operating under the broader umbrella of the Turks and Tong Yabghu. 
Whatever the specifics of their identity, these Turks were ready to accept the alliance 
with the Romans, despite the fact that it was they who had caused it to dissolve in the first place. 
The change requires some explanation. The most obvious shift was a simple generational one. 
On the one hand, Heraclius and the Romans were willing to reapproach the Turkic alliance for 
fairly obvious reasons - they had few options left. But so too had the Turks' circumstances 
changed drastically. Tardush disappears from the historical record after a revolt in 603, 
succeeded by the rather insignificant Niri and Sheguy.202 The year 618 marks the accession of 
the altogether more interesting Tong Yabghu Khagan, who would negotiate the alliance with 
Heraclius. Tong Yabghu's reign was marked by an ambition not seen since Tardush and ending 
in a similar disaster. He is remembered rather poorly in the Chinese sources, as a ruler who 
neglected his own people in favor of foolhardy expansion and warfare; most modem historians 
have concurred.203 But for the Romans, this was perfect. His desire for expansion was targeted 
especially at the Sasanians, and he had apparently either forgotten or chosen to ignore the 
negative animus ofTardush and Tourxanthos. 
It is particularly telling that the authors do not mention the previous alliance, as one 
might expect. If one had solely read these seventh century sources, one would not know that 
there had ever been a previous alliance with the Turks. lt is unlikely that this silence reflects a 
lack of knowledge - after all, Theophanes does mention the earlier alliance as an important 
factor in his chronography of 571/72.204 Rather, it would seem that the lack of mention is an 
202 Sinor. "Establishment,'' 305-07. 
2"' Sinor. "Establishment," 308-10. 
204 Theoph. Chron .. AM 6063. 
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editorial choice, reflective of the prior alliance's lack of relevance to the current one. Support for 
this theory can be found in the fact that, according to Movses, the Sasanians did refer to their 
now quite distant alliance with the Turks in a bid to stop their attacks.205 But we have no 
indication that Heraclius did. Given the fact that Khusro·s attempt failed drastically, it may well 
have been wise to judiciously avoid relying on those prior ties. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that the Romans had learned from their mistakes. 
Nikcphoros, in his Short History, provides an all-important supplement to the alliance 
negotiations~ a diplomatic marriage. According to him, fleraclius' daughter Eudokia was 
wedded to Tong Yabghu at the confirmation of the alliance.206 At least one author has suggested 
that this represents an interpolation from a later romance tradition207 (we have already seen the 
appeal of this foreign marriage motif in the Shahnameh). Skepticism is valid, but there is little to 
suggest that the marriage did not happen, and indeed, the much later Chronicle to 1234, which 
draws on separate Eastern sources, also mentions the marriage. 208 If indeed it is true, it evinces 
the desperation of the Roman position (one can contrast the horror, particularly in the east, at the 
prospect of Attila marrying a daughter of the emperor209). But for the Turks, diplomatic marriage 
was standard policy, as seen with the Sasanians and the Wei. In his appeal to Tong Yabghu, 
Khusro emphasizes that '"we were allied with each other through our sons and daughtcrs."210 It is 
certainly striking that the most successful alliance with the Romans had this unique, important 
attribute. 
205 Movses, / !istOJy, 2.12. 
206 Nik. 12.16-43. 
207 Paul Speck, Das geteilte Dossier: Beobachtungen zu den Nachrichten Uber die Regierung des Kaisers Herakleios 
und die seiner So/me bei Theophanes und Nikephoros (Bonn: Rudolf Habel!, 1988), 288-91. 
208 Howard-Johnston, "Heraclius'," 24, n.75. 
209 Mischa Meier, "A Contest of Interpretation: Roman Policy toward the Huns as Reflected by the 'Honoria Affair,'' 
Journal a/Late Antiquity 10 (2017): 42-61. 
210 Movses, History, 2.12. 
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Alliance secured, the Turks launched a major push into Caucasian Albania, smashing 
through the Derbent Pass. This army was under the command of Tong Yabghu's "nephew, 
whom they call Sat' in honor of his princely rank."211 This is a clear rendering of the well-
attested title of shad, and, as we have seen with Tourxanthos, a familial relationship is perfectly 
reasonable. This anny launched devastating raids throughout the region and made camp on the 
Araxes (within striking distance of the highlands) and dispatched an ultimatum to Khusro, 
demanding his surrender and return of Roman lands, lest he should be destroyed. Khusro sent a 
reply attempting to denigrate the position of Heraclius, but this failed to persuade them, and they 
proceeded to meet with Roman forces. Apparently, the Turks withdrew shortly thereafter, 
returning the next year, now led personally by Tong Yabghu to besiege Tiflis (modern Tbilisi). 212 
The precise timing here is unclear. Theophanes dates these events to 624, which would 
render the entire chronology of Movses incorrect. But considering Thcophanes· clear willingness 
to play fast and loose with his chronology, 213 the otherwise impressively accurate History 0(682 
ought to be trusted over him. Unfortunately, the order of the History here is very confused, 
probably at the hands of a later editor, maybe Movses himself.2 14 Close reading, can, however, 
reconstruct the true order. 
The History places the siege ofTiflis in the thirty-eighth regnal year ofKhusro, i.e., 
somewhere between June 627 and Khusro's murder on February 24 or 25 628.215 This means that 
Tong Yabghu arrived after the initial invasion dated 626/27, led by his dispatched shad-Movses 
even describes a scene of Tong Yabghu choosing to lead personally upon his seeing the 
211 Movses, History, 2.12 
212 Movses, History, 2.12; for this chronological explanation, see below. 
rn Howard-Johnston, Witnesses, 279-84. 
214 Howard-Johnston, Witnesses, 111-12. 
215 Movses History, 83; for dating of Khusro's death, see R.W. Thomson, The Armenian History Attributed to 
Sebeos.· Part I. Translation and Notes (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 85, n. 527. 
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splendiferous loot. 216 Thus, there were probably two separate invasions, a theory supported by 
the withdrawal of the Turks that is placed before the arrival of Tong Yabghu.217 Given that the 
first invasion likely withdrew sometime during 626 (since it began immediately after the 
embassy of 625/26), it could be that Heraclius· relief of Constantinople was what interrupted the 
campaign. It is the later invasion whose "universal wrath" is so strikingly remembered in the 
eyewitness account given in Movses. 218 The description of their depredations clearly shows signs 
of the apocalypticism proposed by the preface of the History of 682, but it nevertheless 
demonstrates just how strongly it remained in the minds of the Albanians. 
Their return marks another difference from Justin's handling of the alliance: Hcraclius 
personally met with Tong Yabghu. Upon meeting him at Tillis, Tong Yabghu apparently made a 
major show of deference to Heraclius by dismounting before him, reported in both Theophancs 
and Nikephoros as a symbol of Roman superiority. 219 Theophanes stops here, but Nikephoros, 
relying on his sources privy to court politics,220 describes the theatrical diplomacy here in 
considerable detail. It is here that he reports the betrothal of Eudokia and Tong Yabghu, and the 
further step of Heraclius' declaring Tong Yabghu his son. In addition, he invited him to remount 
his horse, bestowed imperial robes and pearls upon both Tong Y abghu and his entourage, and 
crowned him with an imperial crown. 221 As Howard-Johnston notes, these actions arc 
extraordinary, and give Tong Yabghu a near-equality with the cmperor222 - this equal, familial 
216 Movses, History, 2.11. 
217 Contra Howard-Johnson, "Heraclius,'' 22-26, who attempts to unify the multiple campaigns presented into a 
single, immediately victorious one. Given that Movses (or, more precisely, the earlier Histo,y) directly gives years 
and provides solid explanatory material to connect the events (even if they are presented out of order in extant 
manuscripts), this reading is unsupported by this source. 
218 Movses, History, 2.11. 
219 Theoph., Chron, AM 6120; Nik. 12.16-43. 
220 Howard-Johnson, Witnesses, 252-53. 
221 Nik. 12.18. 
222 Howard-Johnston, ''Heraclius' ," 24. 
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language was reserved for the Sasanians, begrudgingly acknowledged as equals by the 
Romans. 223 To elevate the Turks to this level of prestige is quite radical, although justified by 
their military strength. The acknowledgement of the Turks as an equal empire stands in direct 
contrast to Justin's characteristically more dismissive attitude - in the time ofHeraclius, the 
Turks were truly allies, not pawns. That is the single largest point of distinction, and key to 
understanding why this later alliance succeeded. 
And succeed it did, despite minor setbacks. The siege ofTiflis was relieved by Sasanian 
forces and the Turks and Romans abandoned the siege. But this was a strategic withdrawal more 
than a retreat. Again, we have a disparity between sources as to what happens next. Movses has 
the Turks returning home after this siege, but Theophanes reports that the Turks joined on an 
invasion of Atropatene, leaving only in winter. 224 Given the selectiveness of Movses, and the fact 
that the reason for the Turks' leaving is their inability to help in Heraclius' invasion of 
Mesopotamia, which happens after the attack on Atropatene, Theophanes is probably correct 
here, and Movses has simply elided it. The Sasanians were defeated in this area, and after the 
Turks had left, Heraclius was free to march into Mesopotamia, fighting the Battle of Nineveh 
and camping outside Ctesiphon. 225 By the return of the Turks next year, a conspiracy had 
assassinated Khusro and peace was being negotiated between the Romans and Sasanians. 
In many ways, this was Justin II and lshtemi's dream realized, a joint Turco-Roman 
assault defeating the Sasanians. There was, however, one crucial difference. Far from the two-
front pincer movement Menander portrays as Justin's aim, the successful defeat of Persia came 
through a coordinated assault in Albania. The evidence does not necessarily suggest that this was 
zv See below· for an example with Heraclius' negotiations with Shahrvaraz. 
224Movses, I-!is/01}. 2.11; Thcoph., Chron., AM 6064. 
125 Sebeos offers the best account, without the troubles of absolute chronology, 38. 125-27. 
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due to a Turkic inability to attack from the East. Just twenty years prior, a Turkic raiding army, 
operating alongside an allied Hephthalite rump state, had penetrated as far as Isfahan, according 
to Sebcos.226 This army was defeated by Smbat IV Bagratuni, but the fact remains that invasion 
of Iran from the East was possible, particularly while Khusro was distracted by his western front. 
So why attack Transcaucasia? 
Practically speaking, this was likely the best option on the table. The sources 
unanimously emphasize that this was a coordinated campaign, with the Turkic invasion being 
perfectly timed with the movement ofHeraclius' troops. Even Movses (or the History 0(682), 
who is friendly to Heraclius but hostile to the Turks, admits that the two were acting in concert. 
Given the sheer distances involved, it is unlikely that any such coordination could have occurred 
between the two fronts.22 7 What is more, there seems to have been an available Turkic anny 
ready to move into Transcaucasia almost immediately- by the chronological reading proposed 
above, the first Turkic invasion occurred rather shortly after the agreement of an alliance. 
Movses suggests that the alliance with the Turks was a surprise attack, 228 which would make 
time even more of the essence. Certainly, the strike was quick enough to preclude any Sasanian 
response to halt it. These sorts of bold surprise attacks were a hallmark of Heraclius' campaigns, 
as shown by his movement north to relieve the siege of Constantinople229 and his later attack on 
Atropatene in winter.230 
So too were there very good strategic reasons for focusing on Transcaucasia. In analyzing 
the Persian campaign of Heraclius, Howard-Johnston makes a brilliant point that bears repetition 
226 Sebeos, 28.102; Sebeos calls the Hephthalites "K'ushans," and the involvement of the Turks is reflected by the 
K'ushans' appeal to the "King in the North." 
227 See Lee, Information, 128-42 for an overview of information transfer with northern barbarians, which, with 
Persia bemg an enemy and thus difficult to pass through, the Turks would have been. 
228 Movses, History, 2.12. 
22() Howard-Johsnton, ·'Heraclius' ,'' 19. 
nn Lee, Information, 93-94, explains the unusualness of this winter campaign. 
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here. By seizing Transcaucasia, the Turks and Heraclius had opened up and threatened the 
central Iranian highlands - lands ultimately more important to the ruling classes of the Empire 
than Mesopotamia, the traditional target of Roman attacks. 231 It can also be added that control of 
the Araxes would threaten Persannenia, which served as the main staging ground for Sasanian 
invasions into Roman territory. 232 In one fell swoop, then, Heraclius and the Turks had 
threatened the very heart of the Sasanians and deprived them of their means of fighting back. 
The degree to which this was a conscious decision is, of course, unknowable. Given the 
importance Heraclius placed on securing allegiances in the region, it is a fair assumption that he 
understood some of its strategic value. 233 Tong Yabghu's strategy is much more difficult to 
reconstruct, although his personal presence south of Caucasus is certainly suggestive of an 
interest in the region. 
Regardless of Heraclius and Tong Yagbhu's perception of that strategic value, it worked. 
The murder ofKhusro was fomented by the very same aristocratic families threatened by the 
Turco-Romans on the Iranian Plateau - as much is stated by our best sources on Iran, Scbeos and 
al-TabarI. 234 As is their wont, the sources primarily ascribe varying, overly personal motivations 
for this coup, but Parvaneh Pourshariati has convincingly merged these accounts into a 
comprehensible reading that supports her broader thesis of the influence ofSasanian-Pa1ihian 
noble families. The precise details need not detain us; it suffices to say that a number ofthcse 
families (mainly the Ispahbudhan, Bagratuni, and Nimruzi), with power bases on the Iranian 
Plateau and Armenian highlands, conspired to overthrow Khusro, beginning with Zad Farrukh' s 
2' 1 Howard-Johnston, "Heraclius','' 41-42. 
212 E.g., Khusro's invasion of 603, Sebeos, 106-110. 
21 ·' Howard-Johnston, "Heraclius'," 36-39. 
2
·
14 Sebeos, 129; al-Tabarl, Histo,y of al-Tabari, Volume V, The Sasanids, The B.vcantines, The Lakhmids, and 
Yemen, trans. C.E. Bosworth (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 379, 381. 
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rebellion c. 626/27, apparently before the "climactic" Battle ofNineveh. 235 Certainly, this built 
on the centuries of tensions so masterfully outlined in the rest of her volume. However, 
Pourshariati has overlooked the immediate trigger. 
A surface reading can show that the most substantial change in the war at this point was 
the entry of the Turks into Albania, and by syllogism alone causation may be ascribed. But we 
can go further. Two of the parties most complicit in the immediate coup236 were those most 
directly imperiled by the Turkic invasions. The Ispahbudhan under Zad Farrukh, were based in 
Atropatene (Azarbayjan)237 which, as we have seen, was being attacked by Turco-Roman forces. 
Varaztirots' Bagratuni (son of the Smbat who had fought the earlier Turkic invasion), ruling in 
Armenia, was also in the direct path of the Turks, as their later invasion confirms. Given the 
paucity of sources, this reading can only be taken so far, and the Nimruzi, based in Sistan were 
apparently motivated by Khusro's turn against their leader Mardanshah. 238 But the Turks are a 
common denominator here, and, by compromising the security of their domains, likely played a 
central motivating role in the nobles' coup, and therefore the surrender of the Sasanians. 
The exact peace treaty at the end of the war does not survive. A Mcnander-csque account 
may well have been preserved in the official history of the campaign written by George of 
Pisidia, but none of our extant sources reproduce it. 239 Certainly. it specified the return of the 
formerly Roman provinces occupied by the Sasanians, but almost universally (likely following 
2' 5 Pourshariati, Decline and Fail, 149-60. 
2·16 As outlined by Pourshariati, Decline and Fall, 152-55; the involvement of the Mihranids comes mostly after the 
deposition. and her accounting for their part is less convincing, considering that the idea of a rebellion by 
Shahrvaraz has been convincingly repudiated by David Frendo, "Byzantine-Iranian Relations before and after the 
Death ofKhusrau II: A Cntical Examination of the Evidence," Bulletin of the Asia Institute 14 (2000): 27-45 
217 Pourshariau, Decline and Fall, 129, 149-153 
vs Pourshariati, Decline and Fall, 157-58. 
239 As outlined by James Howard-Johnston, "The Official History ofHeraclius' Persian Campaigns," in The Roman 
and Byzantine Army in the East, ed. Edward D~browa (Krakow: Drukarnia Uniwersytetu Jagielloliskiego, 1994 ), 57-
87. 
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Heraclius' lead, given his later pageantry), the sources are far more concerned with the return of 
the True Cross than any political ramifications on the Romans' eastern frontier. 240 Specifics are 
thus difficult to come by. However, we can draw broad narrative strokes of the negotiations. 
Immediately after the murder of Khusro, his son and successor Kavad sent a letter, allegedly 
preserved in the Chronicon Paschale, suing for peace. 241 However, Shahrvaraz, leader of the 
occupying Sasanian anny now stationed in Alexandria, refused to abide by the truce. 
Heraclius thus began negotiations with Shahrvaraz - negotiations which would result in 
an alliance between emperor and ambitious general. Heraclius could thereby ensure the removal 
of the occupying anny without undue bloodshed and Shahrvaraz could use Roman forces to 
defeat his enemies in Ctesiphon.242 Nikephoros again mentions a marriage alliance, this time 
between the daughter ofShahrvaraz and Heraclius' son; Shahrvaraz's (Christian) son was also 
made a patrician.243 A further addition is found in the Syriac Chronicle o/724, not without 
problems, but still invaluable and generally trustworthy. 244 The anonymous chronicler claims 
that the Euphrates was the agreed upon boundary between the Romans and Sasanians. 245 Some 
historians have rejected this, seeing it as impossibly conciliatory, given Heraclius' position of 
power. 246 However, Howard-Johnston's argument, which posits that Shahrvaraz simply could 
not politically afford giving these lands to the Romans, is most convincing. 247 It might also be 
added that Shahrvaraz was in a particularly precarious position owing to his being from outside 
the House of Sasan - a fact which rendered him inherently illegitimate. 248 
240 E.g., Theoph., Chron., AM 6120; Ch. Seert 93; Sebeos, 131; Nik. 18. 
241 Chron. Pasch. 735-7. 
242 Pourshariati, Decline and Foll, 177-178. 
241 Nik. 12.16-83. 
244 An excellent assessment of the source may be found in Howard-Johnston, Witnesses, 59-66. 
245 Chr. 784, 147.18-24. 
246 See, e.g., Greatrex and Lieu, Roman Eastern Frontiers, 226-27. 
247 Howard-Johnston. "Heraclius'." 27-28. 
248 Pourshariati, Decline and Fall, 179-83. 
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Despite, or perhaps because of, his illegitimacy, Heraclius was clearly willing to go to 
significant lengths to ensure the success of his new ally. Indeed, he sent a great number of troops 
to his aid in subduing the forces of Ardashir 111.249 Taken together, it appears as though the peace 
with the Sasanians was not a punitive measure so much as a decisive end to the conflict. Much 
like the Treaty of 562, the Romans were willing to make territorial and imperial concessions to 
ensure the continued security of the east. Indeed, according to the often-hyperbolic Chronicon 
Pascha/e, Heraclius had made repeated attempts at peace, even at the expense of becoming a 
tributary state of the Sasanians.250 Likely, this is an exaggeration, but it seems to strike a true 
note of his commitment to ending the war. 
for all that we do not know about the Romans' peace with the Sasanians, the Turks' is 
obscurer by several orders of magnitude; in fact, it is entirely unclear if there was one. There is 
no indication that they were present at the negotiations, either with Kavad or Shahrvaraz. Most 
of the major sources cease mentioning them after 628, save, again, Movses Kagankatvac'i. 
Movses paints a picture of continued Turkic occupation of Albania. The new shad led a number 
of expeditions throughout Transcaucasia, including the successful siege of Ti fl is. Curiously, 
Movses dates these attacks to 629, ostensibly after the Romans had negotiated a truce. His 
chronology can be off, but there is no reason to question him here. This could well indicate that 
whatever settlement was reached by the Romans did not apply to the Turks. Clearly, however, 
the Turks had set up shop in Albania, as is indicated by the rather lengthy interlude where Viroy 
visits the shad and reaches a modus vivendi between occupiers and Albanians.251 Further 
establishing a post-truce dating, Movses relates an attempt by the newly crowned Shahrvaraz to 
249 Sebeos, 129-30. 
2511 Chron. Pasch. 707-709.24. 
251 Movses, History, 2.14; the fuller implications of Turk occupation will be explored below. 
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stop the Turkic expansion in the region. However, atier a classic Parthian feint by the Turks, his 
atmy was utterly crushed and their horses mockingly disfigured. 252 Thence, the Turks were free 
to "[advance] through the passes of the three kingdoms of Armenia, Georgia, and Albania."253 
Only the collapse of the K.haganate repulsed these invaders. 
It has been the tendency in scholarship to divide the continuing Turkic warfare from the 
Roman settlement with the Sasanians, even proposing that the Turks were breaking with imperial 
policy. 254 At most, Howard-Johnston has proposed that part of the agreement with Shahrvaraz 
was giving him "a free hand to deal with the Turks."255 However, the presence of the Turks can, 
in fact, be squared with Heraclius' policy. His main goal was indeed peace, but it was peace for 
the Romans. That goal is rather well-served by continuing warfare in Persia. The Turks provided 
a wonderful distraction for the Sasanians, and their occupation of Transcaucasia prevented a 
Sasanian attack on Roman territory. After all, the ostensible agreement of a Euphrates boundary 
did put the Sasanians within striking distance of Antioch and the Roman East.256 The continual 
presence of the Turks in Transcaucasia could serve as an effective counterweight - the forces of 
the Turks hanging like a Sword of Damocles over any attempt to move south of them. Thus, the 
Turkic occupation of Albania and expansion into Persarmenia may have given Hcraclius the 
confidence to make these terms. 
Through his alliance with the Turks, Heraclius had managed to transform the darkest 
moment of Roman history into an age of tremendous promise. By 630, the Roman position of 
superiority was now firmly established over the Near East. On the other hand, the Turks had 
252 Movses, Histo,y, 2.16. 
253 Movses, History, 2.16. 
254 See, e.g., Greatrex and Lieu, Roman Eastern Frontier, 226. 
255 Howard-Johnston, "Heraclius','' 28. 
256 Greatrex and Lieu, Roman Eastern Frontier, 227. 
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been handed the keys to the kingdom of Albania and had a clear route of expansion in 
Transcaucasia. Times were rarely better for the allies. With the benefit of hindsight, the irony is 
palpable. In fact, the settlement so carefully constructed was a paper tiger, a fact which would 
soon be cast into high relief by the invasions of two new empires: the Muslims and the Tang. 
But, as with the treaty of 562, knowledge of this period's end should not lead us to discount its 
importance. Even without the coming of Islam and Tang imperialism, the three main players had 
been fundamentally changed by this last great war of antiquity, and the Turco-Roman alliance 
was directly at its epicenter. 
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Section Six: Tang Invasion, Islamic Conquests, and the End of the First Khaganatc 
The ultimate end of the Turco-Roman alliance came neither from the Turks nor the 
Romans. It came from the total redefinition of Eurasian dynamic, spurred by two great imperial 
conquests on either side of Asia - the early Islamic conquests and the expansion of Tang China. 
The Turkic Empire, both east and west, collapsed entirely, falling into disorganization and Tang 
hegemony. So too does this mark the end of the Sasanians, the great enemy of the alliance. While 
the Romans did not vanish, the amputation of its wealthiest provinces resulted in a redefinition of 
their empire into one that is fundamentally outside that which is presented here. The present 
examination shall make no attempt to detail the elusive and controversial early Islamic conquests 
nor the better-documented Tang expansion. Rather, it will explain in detail how these events 
ended Turco-Roman cooperation and examine the lasting impact of the alliance on this pivotal 
period. 
The first hints of the corning collapse came not from the west, but from the cast. Owing 
to the nature of the present discussion, little attention has hitherto been paid to the changes in 
China and the Eastern Khaganatc. A short, context-providing retrospective is thus in order. As a 
direct response to the depredations of the Turks, China had witnessed a realignment of their 
political system, first under the Sui dynasty and, after their collapse, the Tang. These new 
dynasties were led by aristocratic families of the Northern frontier and had thus deemphasized 
the Confucian values of the earlier Han dynasty in favor of a more heavily militarized, steppe 
nomad-like political systcrn.' 57 This blend was not new, but its control over a united China was. 
257 Barfield, Perilous, 139-143; any such argument for the fluidity of the Inner Asian frontier is ultimately sourced 
from Owen Lattimore's seminal Inner Asian Frontiers o_fChina; for a modem detailed treatment of cultural and 
institutional melding on the Northern frontier, see Jonathan Karam Skaff, Sui-Tang China and its Turko-Mongol 
Neighbors.· Culture. Power, and Connections, 580-800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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At first, the Eastern Turks were all too happy to raid and profit from the instability the 
establishments of the Sui and Tang caused. However, after the consolidation of Tang control, an 
equally powerful empire was on their southern frontier; the Eastern Turks, racked by civil war, 
were conquered by Emperor Taizong (who proclaimed himself the "'heavenly khagan") in 629. 258 
For all that scholars have often tried to distance the Western Khaganate from the Eastern, 
their histories proved to be inextricably entwined in this period. Tong Yabghu seems to have 
maintained friendly relations with the Tang, being potentially complicit in their conquest of the 
East (or at least enabled it via inaction). It is perhaps easy to see why: with their removal, Tong 
Yabghu was ostensibly the unchallenged master of the steppes. But as we have seen, Movscs 
reports the withdrawal of Turkic forces from Transcaucasia shortly after Shahrvaraz' accession, 
most likely placing it in 630. 259 The ''brigands" that Movses mentions seem to refer to the revolt 
that swept through Tong Yabghu's realm, reported in the Chinese sources. 260 In a rare 
concordance, Movses and the Old Tang Annals both ascribe the collapse of Tong Yabghu's reign 
to his overambitious expansionism and neglect of his own people. 261 After all, his reign had seen 
a major expansion of Turkic power, including a push past the Khyber Pass into Gandhara. 262 
But nowhere is his expansion better documented than in the Caucasus, pa1iicularly in 
Albania. Geographically speaking, steppe nomads taking an interest in the plains of Albania is 
hardly surprising, given its suitability to pastoral nomadism; a similar interest would result in its 
settlement by Turks under the Seljuqs, thereby leading to modem, Turkic-speaking Azerbaijanis. 
And, as evinced by Movses' preservation ofCatholicos Viroy's account, the Turks were in 
258 Barfield, Perilous, 145. 
259 Movses, Histo1y, 106. 
,,,o Sinor, "Establishment," 308-310. 
261 Movses, History, 106, Sinor, "Establishrnent,"309 
262 Golden, Introduction, 135. 
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Albania to stay. Movscs has the Turks, under his unnamed shad, issue an ultimatum demanding 
submission from the Albanians and when they do not receive a reply, the Turks begin to ravage 
the countryside. lt was only through the sage efforts ofViroy (compared directly to Moses in 
delivering his people263 ) that the Albanians supplicate themselves to the Turks and reach a modus 
vivendi. Clearly, this is an account ripe for self-serving manipulation (part of the narration is in 
the first person), and, given the general anti-Turk animus of the Chronicle into which it was 
inserted, their savagery may well be exaggerated. 
More interesting is the quite generous accommodation reached between the Turks and 
Albanians. The dissimilarity of Turkic reasonableness displayed here contrasts sharply with their 
portrayal in the rest of the work, which may itself indicate its historicity. Furthennore, Movses 
describes the presence of tuduns,264 a well-attested Turkic title for a tax collector.265 And as the 
presence of tax collectors suggests, this seems to have been a permanent incorporation into the 
Khaganate. Indeed, as a reparation to the country that he had despoiled, the shad offers to "'repay 
you twofold in man and beast,'' on the condition that he can "rest [his J army within your 
borders. "266 He goes on to respect the Lenten fast and offer the Albanians bread in place of meat 
at the feast confirming their submission. It is far from shocking that this would be negotiated 
with the local Catholicos, and the respect that the shad shows likely indicates an attempt to fold 
him into Turkic administration. 
If the Chinese sources are to be believed, the flip side to this expansion into settled areas 
was a neglect of the nomadic subjects who served as the core of his empire. 267 Given the extreme 
26J Movses, History, 94. 
264 Movses, Hist01y, l O 1. 
2115 Golden, Introduction, 135. 
lM, Movses, Histo1y, 100. 
267 Golden, Introduction, 135. 
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paucity of corroborating evidence, this cannot be coniinned, but we have no reason to disbelieve 
it. Apparently dissatisfied, the Karluks (a subject tribe) launched an open rebellion, and much 
like Khusro II, Tong Yabghu was assassinated by other, presumably sympathetic elements in his 
capital. Thence came a spiral of ephemeral khagans and the complete collapse of central 
khaganal authority. A number of subject tribes broke off altogether, including the Khazars on the 
Pantie-Caspian Steppe. Those who stayed reorganized into a much looser, bipolar confederacy 
known as the On Oq (ten arrows), which was steadily picked at by the Tang for the remainder of 
the century. 
The Roman alliance was clearly an enabler of the expansionist policies of Tong Yabghu, 
and thus contributed directly to the collapse of his rule. However, the Tang role in the collapse of 
the Western Khaganatc ought not be understated. The fonnal conquest of the west was much, 
much slower than the sudden overthrow of the Eastern Khaganate, stretching out over a half-
century and remaining partially incomplete at the rise of the Second Turkic Khaganatc inc. 
682.268 But their influence was felt long before. The Chinese sources imply that many of the 
Turkic tribes not incorporated into the Tang administration fled west, presumably moving into 
Tong Yabghu's land and under his control. 269 Doubtless this was a destabilizing factor in a 
system already straining under the pressure of expansionism and an unbalanced nomad/settled 
equilibrium. In line with traditional steppe policy, the Tang also supported many rebel groups 
that arose after Tong Y abghu' s assassination, furthering its decline. 270 
In any case, the collapse of the Turks had left the Romans without a potential ally in the 
coming conflict with the new power of Islam. The ever-controversial details of the early Islamic 
268 Barfield, Perilous, 145-4 7. 
209 Barfield, Perilous, 145. 
270 Golden. Introduction, 236. 
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conquests cannot be fully examined here. 271 It can at least be said that by 1-!eraclius' death in 
641, the Romans ( or now, if one prefers, Byzantines) had lost their territories south of the Taurus 
to the Muslims. In explaining the Romans' loss to the Muslims, Walter Kaegi aptly describes 
them as "not in a state of collapse,'' but ''fiscally, psychologically, and militarily unstable and 
potentially volatile."272 The Muslims arrived precisely at a moment of Roman vulnerability after 
the peace agreement with the Sasanians. However, many of the mistakes and insufficiencies in 
the defensive policies, most notably an unwillingness to leave fortifications and gain initiative, 
were visible much earlier, notably in the Persian invasions in the 61 Os.273 These weaknesses of 
the Roman military system were compensated for by the Turks in the last great war of antiquity, 
but without their assistance, those weaknesses were laid bare before the Muslim armies. 
But recent events did play a role in the weakness of the Romans in the face of the Muslim 
invasion. After his Turk-assisted victory, Heraclius felt much freer to demobilize his forces, 
reducing the size of the army ready to face the imminent Muslim invasion.274 So too had the 
massive ceremonial of the True Cross's return proved an incredible expense for a Roman 
financial apparatus already reeling. 275 Heraclius can hardly be condemned for his lack of 
omniscience - there was, after all, no reason to believe that a new major threat would appear in 
the East. Regardless, these policies did contribute to Roman unreadiness to face Muslim annies. 
Again, the alliance with the Turks allowed 1-!eraclius to claim a military victory despite 
271 Though an admittedly sanguine reading of the available evidence (and by now quite old), the standard base 
narrative of the conquests remains Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1981); the best account from a Roman perspective is Walter E. Kaegi, Byzantium and the Ear~v Islamic 
Conquests (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); from the Sasanian is Pourshariati, Decline and Fall. 
161-281; all contain vital appraisals of sources and relevant bibliographies. 
272 Kaegi, Byzantium, 46. 
m Kaegi, Byzantium, 262-63, 274-78 
274 Walter E. Kaegi, Herac/ius. Emperor of Byzantium (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2003), 221-24. 
Kaegi, Byzantium, 39A3 gives a good, though necessarily imprecise estimate of the forces. 
275 Kaegi, Hcraclius, 221-22. 
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fundamental, systemic issues at the heart of his empire. That victory allowed for the pursuit of 
policies which would prove detrimental in the coming years. 
Furthermore. the Turks' invasion and brief occupation of Sasanian territory had a 
deleterious effect on their resistance to Muslim armies. The timing here is even more difficult to 
establish here than in the Roman empire, and the challenge to the consensus by Pourshariati 
(who places the initial Muslim conquest contemporary with the Byzantine renewal) has thrown 
the whole affair into disarray. 276 If Pourshariati is correct, this would place the Turkic attacks in 
Transcaucasia as similarly contemporary. In any case, according to Movses, by the time the 
Sasanian forces from Albania and Transcaucasia were called to anns, the Turks were gone. 277 
But the Turks' influence would continue to be felt long after. If the Turkic conquest was even 
half as apocalyptic as Movses portrays, it would be reasonable to suggest that Transcaucasia's 
military power was somewhat sapped. Most importantly, the break between various noble 
families spurred on by the Turkic incursion proved to be a decisive factor in the Sasanian's 
defeat - and indeed their greatest victory was a rare occasion where they managed to work 
together. 278 Regardless of dating, Turkic influence was felt during the Islamic conquests. 
Does that mean that the Turco-Roman alliance and its collapse caused the early Islamic 
conquests? Of course not. Monocausality, always an oversimplification, ought to be wholly 
disregarded in the case of the Islamic conquests, where the extant evidence arguably does not 
give enough information to draw even fallacious conclusions. Nor does everything in the early 
seventh century need to be twisted and manipulated into a teleological ramp-up to the most 
significant event therein. Explaining the Islamic conquests is rather a process of illuminating 
276 Pourshariati, Decline and Fall, 161-281. 
277 Movses, History, 109-10; James Howard-Johnston, ''The Late Sasanian Army," in late Antiquit_v: Eastern 
Perspectives, eds. Teresa Bernheimer and Adam Silverstein (Exeter: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2012), 113-115. 
278 Namely, the battle of the Bridge, chronicled in, Pourshariati, Decline and Fall, 214-19. 
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some of the innumerable contingencies which contributed to its success. And the Turkic alliance 
is one of those contingencies, as is its collapse. Indeed, as we have seen, it may well have been a 
very important one. Perhaps the most illustrative approach, if appropriate, is to imagine an 
alternative hypothetical in which the Turks had never joined the Romans in invading Persia, or 
one in which they had remained in Transcaucasia during the climactic fighting. Both cases would 
assuredly alter the course of the conquests. 
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Conclusion 
Just as we began with Movses' account of the Turkic attack, so too shall we conclude 
with it. Movses most likely compiled the final version of his history some time near the end of 
the tenth century, long after the collapse of the Western Khaganatc. 279 Even the original historian 
of 682 was apparently far enough from the Turks to remember them solely as Khazars. Y ct they 
both chose to devote substantive portions of their work to the history of the Turks in Albania, 
because it was impossible to fully recount their histories without it. That suggests something 
which has become exceedingly apparent over the course of this analysis: the importance of 
Turco-Roman relations to the events of the late sixth and early seventh centuries. Most notably, 
the Turks lay directly at the epicenter of the collapse of Justinian's peace with the Sasanians and 
the final victory over them, their influence bookending the period. 
Thus, the Turco-Roman alliance finds its place as a crucial part of the final century of 
antiquity. But even without that pivotal role, the Turco-Roman alliance provides much insight. 
Analysis of the (comparatively) well-documented alliance with the Romans allows for the best 
glimpse at the goals and motivations of the Turks, particularly the peculiar and evasive Western 
Khaganate. In addition, it charts an evolution of Roman foreign policy, from one which was 
derisive and dismissive of the Turks to one in which they were treated as equals. Bridging the 
vast differences in government and culture, the Turks and Romans found a middle ground, where 
Romans could participate in Turkic institutions and, eventually, Turks in Roman ones. The 
alliance was perhaps a victim of its own success -having created for itself the very conditions 
for its downfall. However, that hardly means that it failed, or that it had no lasting impact to be 
accounted for. 
279 Howard-Johnston, "Armenian Historians," 43. 
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Further, a careful reconstruction of Turco-Roman relations opens a number of exciting 
possibilities for future research. An examination of cultural factors, such as the Turks' and 
Romans' perceptions of each other, might be reconstructed in parallel to the political narrative. 
Equally illuminating would be this narrative's integration into a broader synthesis including 
either Rome's earlier contacts with Inner Asian steppe nomads, later contacts with Turkic 
successor states, or both. The preceding investigation has concentrated on the Romans' evolving 
relationship with the Turkic Khaganate, mentioning events in the Sasanian world only when 
relevant to Rome. However, there is a possibility of reconstructing Turco-Sasanian relationship 
more precisely with the knowledge gained from examining its events as reflected in the Roman 
sphere. By that same token, a study taken more completely from an Inner Asian point of view 
may find an increased role for the Roman alliance in understanding the Turks' internal history. 
Comparative studies with the more heavily studied relationship between the Turks and China 
will also be illuminating. 
Ifthere is a single theme that ought to emerge in continuing scholarship, it is a further 
integration between the often-separate historiographies surrounding the settled Near Eastern 
world and the Inner Asian steppe peoples. For the most part, scholars of the Near East have been 
content either to ignore Inner Asia entirely, or at best have relied on broad-strokes syntheses 
rather than fully engaging with the vibrant body of scholarship. Obviously, the rigors of 
discipline and the limitations of human beings somewhat moderate the ability of scholars to 
easily travel between these worlds. However, if the preceding work has demonstrated anything, it 
is that a closer integration is not only fruitful, but necessary for fully understanding the events in 
the Near East. 
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Most importantly, this examination has allowed the First Turkic Khaganate to emerge as 
a powerful political force in the Near East. Throughout the surveyed period, they have clearly 
demonstrated their agency in their relationship with the Romans; they remained strikingly 
consistent in goals and aims and possessed the means of accomplishing them. It is hardly a 
coincidence that, in covering the Turco-Roman alliance, it has been necessary to mention most of 
the most significant events of the period. Why9 Because those events are intertwined with the 
actions of the Turks in general and the Turco-Roman alliance in particular. That strikes back at 
the Roman-centric, Iran-centric, and anti-nomadic biases which have often relegated it to a 
tertiary role. Those biases emerge naturally from the sources, but a careful reading thereof has 
demonstrated the insufficiency of that model. Even the Romans themselves, so dismissive of the 
Turks in the beginning, were compelled to acknowledge a parity between the two empires in the 
time ofHeraclius. In moving forward with the study of the Late Antique Near East, it is time for 
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